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The Sendero Luminoso, or Shining Path, rebellion in
Peru was launched during the summer of 19 80. Although the
group was relatively unknown, and initially dismissed as a
weak and unimportant movement among the Indian peasants of
the Andean highlands ,'. the Sendero guerrillas have proven to
be a resilient and dedicated threat to the Peruvian democratic
regime.
This thesis examines the Sendero Luminoso question from
three different perspectives. Their use of Maoist strategy
and tactics as interpreted by Abimael Guzman is discussed
at length. The counterinsurgency program is analyzed to ex-
plain its failures and offer suggestions for improvement.
Finally, the problem is reviewed from the aspect of the
central government during the last two decades.
It is concluded that although Sendero Luminoso poses no
immediate threat to assume power, the guerrillas possess the
capability to inflict damage for at least the near future.
Recommendations for United States policy regarding Peru and
Sendero Luminoso are included in the final chapter.
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I. THE ORIGINS OF SENDERO LUMINOSO
During the Peruvian national elections of 19 80, an unknown
group of radical militants attempted to disrupt the voting
process in a small town of the southern highlands. Several
years later, Sendero Luminoso, or Shining Path, has become
a widespread menace throughout the country. The Sendero
rebellion has tested the resources and perseverance of the
young democratic regime installed in 198 5, and has proven
resilient against the counterinsurgency effort designed to
eradicate it. Dedicated to the use of force and dogmatically
swearing allegiance to Maoist theory as interpreted by its
leader, Abimael Guzman Reynoso, Sendero has emerged as a
guerrilla movement markedly different from other revolution-
ary movements in modern Latin America. Born in a nation
besieged by historical and modern socioeconomic and cultural
disparities, Sendero has established itself as an armed
vanguard whose professed goals are the violent destruction
of the Peruvian state, and the ultimate rise to power of a
union of the proletariat and popular masses of Inca descendants
In order to comprehend the Sendero experience, it is
necessary to explore the objective conditions which led to
its inception. Within the whole of Latin America, perhaps
Peru reigns supreme as the most prominent inheritor, and
indeed victim, of the legacy of its colonial past. While one
Peruvian society thrives in the modern cities along the
coast, quite another survives in the cordillera of the Andes.
Sendero Luminoso sought and established the majority of its
constituents among the desperate peasantry of these highlands.
The political evolution of the party initially came from
the doctrinal split of Soviet and Chinese factions within
the Peruvian Communist Party in the early 19 60's. Further
splintering of various communist factions along ideological
lines led to the emergence of elements that consistently
favored the rejection of anything short of armed revolution
to achieve their political ends. By the late 1970s, these
extremists formed the core leadership of Sendero Luminoso.
Moreover, the intellectual evolution of the party closely
follows the personal growth and development of Abimael Guzman,
heralded as the "Fourth Sword of Communism" (following Marx,
Lenin, and Mao) by his followers. Finally, the renaissance
of the University of San Cristobal Huamanga (UNSCH) in the
city of Ayacucho provided the vehicle for the spread of
Guzman's revolutionary message among a rural population
that, at least initially, was willing to accept the alterna-
tive solutions proposed by the guerrillas.
One of the principal reasons for the appeal of Sendero
promises for change stems from the calamitous state of the
rural highlands. In essence, Peru has been widely divided
into two different realities since the arrival of the
Spanish conquistadores in the sixteenth century. The nation
remains partitioned by social, economic, racial, and geo-
graphic barriers which have stymied the forces of integration
and reform. In" demographic terms, European or ."white" groups
constitute fifteen percent of a total population of nearly
thirteen million. The mestizo population represents thirty
seven percent, while the various groups of Peruvian Indians
make up the largest group with over forty five percent of
the total. These racial groups are not uniformly distributed
throughout the country. The white population, which is also
the economically privileged segment of society, is concen-
trated in urban population centers along the coast. The
coast, in addition to providing a haven for the upper class,
is also the site of the richest farmland and most advanced
agricultural technology. The mestizo element is more diverse,
and is situated more evenly throughout the country. While not
approaching the white population in terms of material wealth
and power, the mestizos are definitely superior in comparison
with the oppressed and impoverished Indian population.
Linguistically, seventy percent of the Peruvian population
speaks Spanish as a first language, while twenty five percent
speak Quechua , the native language of the Inca descendants,
2
as the primary form of communication. The southern highlands,
Richard F. Nyrop, ed
.
, Peru: A Country Study (Washington
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1981), p. xiv.
Nyrop, Peru, p. xiv.
in contrast to the coast, are remote and highly isolated
from the centers of power. Native Indians represent a large
percentage of the regional population, most of whom rely on
traditional subsistence farming in an area plagued by high
altitude, poor farmland, and a woeful lack of technology.
It is in these highlands that Sendero Luminoso maintains its
strongest base of support. The movement is centered around
the department of Ayacucho . Even when compared to other
highlands regions of Peru, Ayacucho and the neighboring de-
partments are isolated, backwards, and impoverished. Essen-
tially, the area is a fourth world enclave within a third
world region.
The area surrounding Ayacucho is an ideal site for a
revolutionary movement. The area is largely inaccesssible
,
and has a history of being ignored by the governments seated
in Lima. People of the southern highlands earn little, die
young, are mostly illiterate, and usually exist without basic
human services. Based upon a 1972 census, ninety percent of
the nearly 500,000 inhabitants spoke Quechua as a primary
language. In geographical terms, the Andean zone comprises
a harsh environment. Forty five percent of the territory is
located in the frigid high altitude of the mountains, devoid
of any tree vegetation. Twenty four percent is permanently




subtropical climate or jungle, while only four percent of
4
the land is under cultivation.
The little arable land that is cultivated has steadily
exhausted its fertility. While potatoes, the principal crop
of the region, were produced at a level of 161 kilograms
per capita from the period of 19 51-55, the production declined
to 110 kilograms between 1971-77. The southern highlands
suffered up to a fifty percent drop in agricultural output
in 1983 due to the drought caused by the climatic changes
associated with the El Nino ocean current. In spite of a
decreasing trend in basic food production, the department of
Ayacucho has witnessed a population increase of nearly fifty
percent since 1940. Average caloric intake for individuals
in some of the particularly poor zones has been estimated at
as little as 420 calories per day, well below the 850 calorie
minimum established by the World Health Organization.
This growing population had little to look forward to in
terms of quality of life and basic services. Average life
expectancy in the department of Ayacucho is forty five years,
compared to a national average of fifty eight years, and well
below the life expectancies of many of the most impoverished
4
Raul Gonzales, "Ayacucho: Por Los Caminos de Sendero,"
Quehacer, October 1982, p. 42.
Cynthia McClintock, "Why Peasants Rebel: The Case of




nations of the world. The lack of medical services is indi-
cated by the ratio of one physician per 17,860 people, com-
pared to 1,822 on the coast. The mortality rate has approached
thirteen percent, while infant mortality surpasses nineteen
percent. In 1972, 93.4 percent of the population in Ayacucho
remained without potable water, and 94.4 percent had no
access to electricity. During the period of military rule
from 1968 to 1980, little was done to improve the situation.
The four highland zone departments of Huancavelica, Cuzco,
Ayacucho, and Apurimac received only 6.7 percent of the total
national public investment. Ayacucho was the lowest among
them, with a total investment of 0.6 percent.
Sendero Luminoso was not the first group to recognize the
plight of the ignored Indian peasantry, nor the first to advo-
cate fundamental change through armed revolution. Develop-
ment of a modern revolutionary concept in Peru began in the
closing decades of the nineteenth century in the writings of
Manuel Gonzales Prada. Gonzales Prada was part of a group
of intellectuals concerned with promoting social as well as
political revolution in Peru. During the early nineteenth
century, the concept of revolution was primarily concerned
6 -Carlos Amat y Leon, "La Desigualdad Interior en el Peru,"
and a 1981 report on world development published by the
World Bank, cited in Raul Gonzales, "Ayacucho: Por los
Caminos de Sendero," Quehacer , October 198 2, p. 71.
7Gonzales, "Ayacucho: Por los Caminos de Sendero,"
p. 71, citing 1982 documents of the Prime Minister.
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with replacing elites in positions of power and authority
with no accompanying transformation of social and economic
structures. Originally an aristocrat, Gonzales Prada re-
nounced his upper class heritage and called for a complete
restructuring of Peruvian society. He harshly criticized
a government ruled by men seeking personal gain while ignor-
ing the fundamental needs of the society they ruled. His
writings contained four major themes:
(1) National integration based on the indigenous heritage
of the Inca
.
(2) Land reform and the elimination of the hacienda
system.
(3) Criticism of the ruling elite for their European
cultural bias.
(4) Criticism of the Catholic church for its involve-
ment in politics.
°
Gonzales Prada was deeply concerned over the condition of
the peasantry, and glorified their Inca heritage. His writ-
ings provided an intellectual point of departure for Jose
Carlos Mariategui in the 19 20's.
Mariategui was not a political theorist in the Western
European tradition. Born a mestizo, he never acquired a
university education. While brilliant, Mariategui never
possessed a highly disciplined intellect. He was initially
a journalist who turned to political activism in his later
life. Mariategui was principally concerned with issues of
8 -*John M. Baines, Revolution in Peru: Mariategui and the




racial and cultural pluralism, and the problem of how to
organize a fragmented society so that economic growth would
occur. In his view, none of the fundamental problems of the
country could be solved before the establishment of a legi-
timate political order based upon the desires of the Indian
and mestizo masses, and not of the white European minority.
Mariategui sought to develop a truly national ideology of
social change through- the combination of Marxist and indigen-
ous themes. In his view, political legitimacy in Peru had
been absent since the destruction of the Inca empire in the
sixteenth century. Hence, his ideology of the new revolution
consisted of four major elements. First, a commitment to
obtain a better moral and material way of life for the masses
through fundamental changes in the social system. Second, a
willingness to adopt non-Hispanic, non-Peruvian ideas to
explain existing social and political conditions, and to use
Marxist explanations to justify changing those conditions.
Third, an attempt to create a new sense of national identity
through the synthesis of these ideas. Finally, a commitment
to obtain the material benefits of a modern, secular, indus-
trialized society while retaining the moral and spiritual
purpose of that society. These principles formed the under-
lying thematic basis for his central ideological work, Siete
ensayos de interpretacion de la realidad peruana (Seven
9





was the first to grasp the fundamental problems facing his
society, and the first Peruvian to propose both Marxist and
nationalist solutions to them. His thoughts remain an endur-
ing philosophical force throughout much of Peruvian society
to this day.
Mariategui was instrumental in the re-founding of the
Peruvian Socialist Party (PSP) in 1928. Although he intended
for it to be a new arid vital source for political change, by
the time of his death in 1930, the party had been overtaken
by members who desired to establish a Communist party. One
month after the death of Mariategui, the Central Committee of
the PSP adopted a resolution which changed the name and the
direction of the party. Hence, the Peruvian Communist Party
(PCP) was born under the supervision of the Comintern.
The immediate political origins of Sendero Luminoso stem
from the ideological fragmentation which began to occur within
the PCP during the early 1960 's. In 1962, the PCP departed
from its militant stance, choosing to vote for Belaunde in
order to counter the rise to power of the American Popular
Revolutionary Alliance (APRA) , a political rival offering
The most comprehensive source of information on the
early evolution of Sendero is in Rogger Mercado, El Partido
Comunista del Peru: Sendero Luminoso (Lima: Ediciones de
Cultura Popular, 1982), p. 22. Sources in English include
Lewis Taylor, Maoism in the Andes: Sendero Luminoso and the
Contemporary Guerrilla Movement in Peru (Liverpool: Codaprint,
1983), and David Scott Palmer, "The Sendero Luminoso Rebellion
in Rural Peru," in Latin American Insurgencies , ed . Georges
Fauriol (Georgetown University: Center for Strategic and
International Studies, 1985), pp. 67-96.
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non-Marxist leftist alternatives to the communist vision.
During the Fourth Conference of the PCP in January 19 64, a
pro-Chinese faction split to form the PCP-Bandera Roja (Red
Flag) . Its adherents charged that the leadership of the PCP
was not seriously addressing the issue of armed struggle, and
had become pacifist and conciliatory.
During this period, Abimael Guzman, future leader of
Sendero Luminoso, headed the Huamanga command of the Castro-
ite National Liberation Front (FLN) at the National University
of San Cristobal Huamanga in Ayacucho. In the first years
of the organization, Guzman recruited top students for trips
to Cuba, and for various university programs which were active
in the Ayacucho countryside. By 19 64, there were approxi-
mately fifty students who regularly participated in these
activities. The Huamanga command broke with the national
FLN organization in 1965 over the issue of opening foquista
guerrilla fronts throughout the country. Guzman and his
followers advocated a longer term strategy, based on the
Chinese revolutionary experience of rural mobilization. By
1966, they had joined forces with the PCP-Bandera Roja.
The following year, Guzman assumed responsibility for
agitation and propaganda for the party, and was put in charge
of producing the newspaper of the organization. Guzman began
to publish fiery editorials, and developed followers among
Palmer, "The Sendero Luminoso Rebellion in Rural Peru,"
p. 69.
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those opposed to the PCP-BR central leadership for not suffi-
ciently overseeing the preparations for the armed revolution.
In 1970, Guzman split from Bandera Roja, forming the party
known today as Sendero Luminoso. The name of the party
comes from its origins in a student political group known as
Frente Estudiantil por el Sendero Luminoso de Mariategui
(the "Revolutionary Student Front for the Shining Path of
Mariategui" )
.
From 1970-77, Sendero Luminoso concentrated on the develop-
ment of a party apparatus. It was especially successful in
garnering support among university students. Though regional
committees and cells were formed throughout the country, they
were mostly concentrated in the central sierra and the capital
city of Lima. In its early propaganda campaign, Sendero
criticized the other leftist parties for having abandoned
the commitment to armed revolution, and called for a revolu-
tion originating in the countryside to topple the Velasco
regime, installed in 1968, which it labeled as fascist. In
1977, the party entered the second stage of preparation for
the armed struggle it would launch in 1980. Its effort to
establish an effective national organizational infrastructure
was aided by the incorporation of dissatisfied radicals from
other leftist groups. When the Vanguardia Revolucionar ia
split in 1976, the most militant and Maoist influenced sector
formed the Vanguardia-Revolucionaris-Proletaria Comunista
(VR-PC)
. This group found the majority of its membership in
17
the highland departments near Ayacucho. Similar to Sendero,
the VR-PC adopted an ultra-left non-participatory stance re-
garding the 1978 Constituent Assembly elections, only to do
an about-face in 1979. Sendero members had infiltrated the
group in 1978, and were able to recruit several of its most
important peasant militants in the confusion and disenchant-
ment over the electoral issue. In a similar fashion, Puka
Llacta (Red Homeland -In Quechua) broke from the Patria Roja
(Red Fatherland, a militant faction which separated from
Bandera Roja in 1967) in 1979 to join Sendero. The member-
ship of Puka Llacta consisted mainly of miners in the depart-
12
ments of Junin and Pasco. Other small groups and
dissatisfied party members from different organizations were
drawn to Sendero, sharing a common vision of an imminent
armed struggle and fundamental changes in Peruvian society.
Many have speculated that Abimael Guzman is hardly a
likely candidate to have arrived at the position of leading
a revolutionary organization. Born on December 4, 19 24 to
a middle class family near the city of Arequipa, the young
Guzman quickly established a reputation as a gifted and dedi-
cated student. He went on to earn twin degrees in Philosophy




For an elaboration on the evolution and subsequent
strategies chosen by Sendero, see Chapter II.
Arequipa, defending dissertations on The Theory of Space in
Kant and The Democratic Bourgeois State . In 1962, he was
invited to teach at' the University of. San Cristobal de
14Huamanga in Ayacucho. There, Guzman became more active in
radical politics, frequently inviting his students to join
in political debates at his home. These students were later
to become many of the leaders of the Sendero movement.
The reopening of 'the university in Ayacucho in 19 59, after
its closure in 1886 following the defeat of Peru in the War
of the Pacific, was an elemental factor in the rise of Sendero
Luminoso in the Andean highlands. The primary purpose of the
educational curriculum was to be functional in meeting the
needs of the community. Programs such as nursing, education,
applied anthropolo'gy , and rural engineering were emphasized,
while no law school or medical school was established.
Quechua was required for those few students not already versed
in the language. The vast majority of the students came from
the peasant families of the immediate region. Despite an
original intent to keep politics out of the educational realm,
the university increasingly found its programs and services
dominated by the radical thought of the students, professors
and administrators. Students came to view professors as
14Juan Carlos Alvanaraz, "Guerra Civil en el Peru,"
Equis X , 18 July 1983, pp. 5-6.
Palmer, "The Sendero Luminoso Rebellion in Rural
Peru," p. 80.
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more than mere educators, but as advisers regarding all
classes of problems.
The awakened yearning for education in Ayacucho quickly
outstripped the limited services of the UNSCH, and led to
the creation of the V.A. Belaunde University, which was
directed to accept the majority of students who had failed
to pass the entrance examinations of the other institution.
Additionally, the second school offered programs such as
law, which addressed issues far from the Ayacuchan reality.
After a brief existence (1967-1976), the university was dis-
solved. The students and academic programs were absorbed
into the UNSCH, quickly overcrowding the school well beyond
1
6
its designed operating capacity. The establishment of
these higher educational institutions had a lasting effect
on the city of Ayacucho as well. Within ten years, it grew
three times in size, and developed a limited commercial
activity.
As Peruvian social scientist Luis Millones states,
The arrival of the university (locals, methodology,
people) was equivalent to an earthquake, not only for
its physical presence but for the acceleration of the
rhythm of provincial life. Local business grew rapidly,
hotels and boarding houses appeared, and the local
elite was displaced by the teachers who constituted
a new nucleus of conversation and debate.
Luis Millones, "La Tragedia de Uchuraccay : Informe
Sobre Sendero," in Informe de la Comision Investigadora de
los Sucesos de Uchuraccav, Carlos Castro et al . (Lima:







The University of Huamanga was to have a lasting effect on
the' students which would ultimately convince some of them to
seek the revolutionary change promised by Sendero. Their
higher education would make them more aware of the decimated
state of development throughout the local region, especially
relative to other sections of the country. Furthermore, be-
cause the degrees awarded by the university were not held in
high esteem by the rest of Peru, the graduates quickly became
frustrated by their difficulty in finding employment. This
was particularly true when they sought jobs in the coastal
cities and were placed in competition with professionals and
graduates of more respected institutions (and of a different
race and culture). Finally, the radical politicization of
the university during the 19 6 0's provided a forum in which
students were able to explore alternative solutions to their
social problems. As Sendero Luminoso gained strength as a
local political force, its message was spready by way of
students participating in extension and outreach programs.
Being native to the region, these students were able to
preach their newfound doctrine to an accepting audience,
since the population traditionally viewed outsiders with
skepticism.
In summary, the Sendero Luminoso movement has sought to
apply the Maoist theory of revolution, based on the mobili-
zation of the peasant masses, to a Peru they classify as
semi-feudal and semi-colonial. Their target audience of
21
highlands peasants is among the most destitute and under-
developed in the entire world. Although the present Sendero
movement emerged from a series of ideological and political
schisms in which its adherents continually chose a hard-line
and militant stance, it has avoided following a path to rapid
annihilation through unpreparedness . On the contrary, Guzman
and his disciples carefully and painstakingly worked toward
the initiation of the. armed revolution in 1980. The result
has been a resilient movement which has resisted efforts by
the authorities to eradicate it during the last six years.
In the following chapters, the Sendero Luminoso experience
shall be analyzed from three different perspectives. The
strategy and tactics of the guerrillas will be examined in
order to shed light on why these militants operating in a
remote sector of the world consider themselves to be at the
forefront of a world revolution. The counter insurgency pro-
gram will be surveyed in order to explore its lack of success
in the past, and to suggest modifications to improve it in
the future. Finally, the question of Sendero will be viewed
from the point of view of the central government in Lima, in
order to explain why a host of regimes of varying ideological
persuasions did not take measures to alleviate the miserable
situation of the highlands peasantry prior to their taking
up arms in 19 80.
22
II. ANALYSIS OF STRATEGY AND TACTICS
The emergence of Sendero Luminoso as perhaps the most
radical and dogmatic revolutionary organization in Latin
American history provides a rich case for analysis of its
ideological, strategic, and tactical objectives. In con-
trast to the most recent Peruvian experience of foquista
insurgents who were easily defeated during the 19 60 's, the
Sender ista armed insurrection launched in 19 8 has proven to
be tenacious and enduring. The counterinsurgency programs
directed by the government have probed and at times exceeded
the constitutional limits of a redemocraticized republic.
Led by the political thought of Abimael Guzman, Sendero seeks
to synthesize the Maoist tenets of a long rural struggle with
the Mariategui principles of a Peruvian reality expressed
in the 1930' s and still applicable today. According to his
disciples, Guzman is the "Fourth Sword of Communism," follow-
Marx, Lenin, and Mao. The revolution in Peru, therefore, is
not an isolated experience, but rather, part of a worldwide
movement. In this context, Sendero is seen as innovative
and takes the lead so that others may follow.
The Senderista model for a successful revolution relies
on four requisites. First, the necessity of a directing
party based on Marxism-Leninism and the philosophy of Mao
Tsetung with a correct line of thought forged previously in
the political, theoretical, and organizational realms.
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Second, armed struggle is a means to one end: a revolu-
tionary program that answers the fundamental needs of the
working class and the people, and that rigorously describes
the strategic objective in accordance with the specific
conditions of each country. Third, that the party should
develop prior to and during the course of the revolutionary
war, this comprising a permanent fight against all forms of
revisionism and anti-Marxism. Finally, prior to launching
the armed struggle, the party should undertake a long, patient,
and intense effort to develop the political consciousness
and organizational level of the masses.
In ideological terms, Sendero adheres to the Mariategui
vision and description of a semifeudal and semicolonial Peru,
and justifies these premises for a direct comparison and
correlation of modern Peru with prerevolutionary China. The
Maoist concept of a protracted revolutionary war beginning
in the rural areas and growing to encircle and isolate the
cities is a doctrine which, at least at a surface level,
would appear to be a logical vision to promote in the under-
developed regions of the southern Andean highlands. Julio
Cotler, a respected Peruvian political scientist, cites three
reasons for the success of Maoism as a political ideology.
It provides a clear explanation of the environment of the
Andean peasant in line with their limited social and political
Raul Gonzales, "Especial Sobre Sendero," Quehacer,
August 1984, p. 28.
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horizons. The ideology fills a void caused by the absence
of a varied and democratic party system practiced by diverse
social groups. Although Peru currently operates and has
functioned in the past under democratic regimes, the political
process has primarily only applied in the urban power centers
of the coast while ignoring the outlying areas. The politi-
cal climate of the University of Huamanga as an educational
center also greatly Contributed to establishment of a Maoist
2belief system in the region. Peruvian anthropologist Luis
Millones attributes the success of the Maoist logic to the
failure of agricultural modernization in the zone during the
last ten years. The reforms were not as effective as originally
anticipated. Development actions raised the consciousness
of the people, and their failed expectations left the
peasantry susceptible to seeking alternatives to better their
3
situation. English scholar Lewis Taylor adds that the Sendero
ideology aligns itself well with a history of Andean messian-
ism. Promises made for a return of Indian power mesh well
with a historic vision of a Golden Age prior to the arrival
2
Raul Gonzales, "Una Enquesta Sobre Sendero," Quehacer
,
January 1983, p. 66.
Luis Milones , "La Tragedia de Uchuraccay : Informe Sobre
Sendero," in Informe de la Comision Investigadora de los
Sucesos de Uchurraccay
, Carlos Castro et al . (Lima: Impreso
en Editora Peru, 1983), p. 98.
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of the Spanish conquistadores which remains strong among
4
rural peasants and urban mestizos.
In one of its two principal domestic documents, Sendero
calls upon the peasantry to join the revolution as a continu-
ation of the historical experience of its existence. In
"Desarrollamos la Guerra de Guerrillas," or "Let Us Develop
the Guerrilla War," published in 19 82, the pamphlet states,
And what is currently the situation of the people? A
peasantry with a fundamental demand going back centuries
'land for those who work it,' which in spite of an
unfaltering struggle has still not managed to achieve
it; a peasantry which during the last twenty years they
[the government] have tried to deceive with three pur-
ported agrarian reform laws, which after being intro-
duced with high sounding demagogy, have left the
peasants with the same old unsatisfied hunger for land.
The historical demand for land has been accompanied equally
by a people with a legacy of armed struggle. The same pam-
phlet dictates,
The violence of revolution is, then, the same essence
as our historical process and if the emancipation of
the republic was won with arms on the fields of battle,
it is easy to understand that the development and
triumph of the Peruvian revolution, of our democratic
revolution for the emancipation of the people and of
the classes, will be gained only by means of the largest
revolutionary war of our people, raising the masses by
means of the popular war.°
4 Lewis Taylor, Maoism in the Andes: Sendero Luminoso
and the Contemporary Guerrilla Movement in Peru (Liverpool:
Codaprint [1983], p. 19.
5
"Desarrollamos la Guerra de Guerrillas," reproduced in
Rogger Mercado , Algo Mas Sobre Sendero (Lima: Ediciones de
Cultura Popular, 1983), p. 38.
Mercado, Algo, p. 40.
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Since its beginning, Sendero has been committed to a
long and patient preparation toward the armed "popular war"
it launched in 1980. The first stage of the party existence
took place from 1970 to 1977. This period was dedicated to
"Retomar a Mariategui" or to reassume the political thought of
the Peruvian Marxist which had been diluted and lost in the
ideological struggles within the Communist Party. During
this phase, the party leadership abandoned practical questions
7
and concentrated absolutely on theoretical matters. Politi-
cal cells were formed throughout the nation with the main
concentrations located in Lima and the southern highlands.
Sendero accused the rest of the Peruvian left as being revi-
sionist and attacked the Velasco regime as being fascist.
Their version of rural armed struggle was promoted as the
only viable strategic alternative. Sendero saw no value in
pursuing any type of electoral strategy in future elections,
and hence refrained from the political mobilization of the
urban proletariat practiced by other leftists throughout the
1970's.
This initial stage was viewed as complete by 1978, and
Sendero entered its second stage, that of Reconstructing the
Party. The goal of this period was to establish the party
o
as an effective apparatus to carry out the armed struggle.
7 Rogger Mercado, El Partido Comunista del Peru: Sendero
Luminoso (Lima: Ediciones de Cultura Popular, 1982), p. 22.
gMercado, El Partido, p. 22.
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Internal debate over the strategy of the war emerged within
the leadership. The prolonged rural war with the eventual
encirclement of the cities was advocated by Guzman. An
alternative vision was proposed by Luis Katawa and others
on the Central Committee to pursue the Albanian line, which
favored equal weight of armed actions in the cities and the
countryside. This debate continued throughout 1980-81 with
9Guzman eventually achieving majority support. During this
second phase, Sendero went underground. Militants left the
university for the rural zones fully prepared to integrate
into the communities, learn the Quechua tongue if necessary,
establish their training camps, and preach the message of
revolution
.
Although the party leadership had reached a unanimous
decision to proceed with the armed revolution at the IX
Plenary Session of the Central Committee in 1978, some fac-
tionalization existed over whether the revolutionary situation
in Peru was stationary or evolving. This debate was resolved
by 19 79 in a statement that the outbreak of armed revolution
can mobilize the country, even in adverse conditions. In a
document published in September 1979 titled "Let Us Develop
the Growing Popular Protest!", the leadership professed,
We can say that a stationary revolutionary situation
can be converted to a developing revolutionary situation
by action of the subjective conditions over the objec-
tive condition; that is very important to keep in mind.
9 Taylor, Maoism, p. 12.
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Furthermore, it is necessary to differentiate the un-
equal development of the revolutionary situation and
take into account what can take place in a particular
region and that the proper revolutionary action can be
generalized throughout the country, and, furthermore,
the armed struggle can be initiated in the middle of
a general retreat of the revolution as proven by the
uprisinq of the Autumn Harvest during August 19 27 in
China. lc5
In addition to drawing on the theoretical and revolution-
ary experiences of the Chinese, Sendero has been able to learn
from the mistakes of a doomed insurgency in Peru during the
1960's. Following the success of the Cuban Revolution, the
Castro regime was actively seeking to export their experi-
ence throughout Latin America. It trained future guerrilla
officers, as well as providing logistical and financial help.
The young Peruvian intellectuals attracted to this revolution
were largely from upper middle class backgrounds. This was
true of Luis de la Puente and Guillermo Lobaton of the Move-
ment of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) and Hector Bejar of the
Army of National Liberation (ELN) . These groups were com-
mitted to using armed force to secure agrarian reform and
nationalization of oil and mining resources . Three main fronts
were opened in the virgin forests and the Andean highlands.
Although the terrain was difficult, the guerrillas believed
that they could use it to their tactical advantage in con-
frontations against the Army. The guerrillas proved to be
naive and unprepared for the task. The background of the
"Desarrollamos la Creciente Protesta Popular!", cited
by Piedad Pareja Pflucker, Terrorismo y Sindicalismo en
Ayacucho (Lima: 1981), p. 86.
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leadership left it unprepared to communicate in Quechua and
establish any semblance of a recruiting effort among the very
elements they struggled to defend. Furthermore, the barren
geography of the Andes, in marked contrast to the Cuban ter-
rain, left the insurgents highly vulnerable to detection by
military aviation and surveillance patrols. They were routed
at the hands of the Army in a matter of months.
Sendero has obviously learned a great deal from the
failure of its predecessors, and appears not to be willing
to commit the same errors which led to the foquista demise.
By declaring adherence to a long term strategy, the Sender istas
have avoided the poor organization and preparation that marked
their counterparts. Additionally, the coastal urban composi-
tion of the foquista leadership and the superficial knowledge
of the Andean condition have been replaced by the active
Sendero recruitment of militant peasants native to the high-
lands who are familiar with the language, geography, and
customs of the region. Sendero has also criticized the
previous guerrillas for not selecting the proper historical
moment. They chose to undertake the revolution at a time
when the revolutionary correlation of forces had not reached
maturity. Finally, the foquista insurgents were open in
meeting with the press in an effort to publicize their cause.
Sendero has been extremely reclusive, choosing only to pub-
lish nationally two slim pamphlets, and granting an occasional
clandestine interview.
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Having resolved the debate regarding the initiation of
a prolonged rural struggle, Sendero chose to commence its
actions simultaneously with the presidential elections of
May 1980. Their first action was the burning of ballot
boxes in the village of Chuschi in the department of Ayacucho.
Most Peruvians first heard of Sendero Luminoso when the citi-
zens of Lima were confronted by the sight of dead dogs hanging
from utility poles along the principal boulevard of the
city. The carcasses were decorated with placards denouncing
the "fascist dog of Deng Xiaoping" and praising the Chinese
Gang of Four. This scene was repeated some time later in the
city of Ayacucho, among illiterate peasants who could only
guess as to the significance of the animals. According to a
popular Andean legend among the Indians, a dog is a com-
panion who follows or leads his master to the grave. When-
ever a dead dog appeared, someone was soon to die or be
executed. This symbolic myth was to later come true with
overwhelming and horrible regularity in the southern highlands
According to Sendero, choosing the proper moment to begin
the revolution is infinitely more complex than merely choosing
the moment for the development of the armed struggle. The
direction of the Party is equally as important as the objec-
tive historical process. A 1982 document states,
It has to do with knowing to discern when the revolu-
tionary situation has matured sufficiently, not only
Philip Bennet, "Corner of the Dead," Atlantic , May
1984, p. 28.
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by virtue of its own development, but as a result of
conscious action by the Communist Party over the objec-
tive base, how to be able to launch in time the
superior form of the fight of the revolution. 12
One of the recently published of the rare Sendero docu-
ments was circulated in Spain in 1984. It was titled, "The
Truth About the People's War in Peru." The pamphlet was
primarily written as a revolutionary handbook utilizing Peru
as a present case study. The five stages of revolution were
presented as follows:
1) "Agitation and armed propaganda. First actions
and training of the combatants in attacks with
limited objectives. This lasted from May 1980
until the end of 1981."
2) "Systematic sabotage and initiation of the first
regular guerrilla actions destined to destroy the
power of the bourgeois landowner in the zones chosen
to be bases of support. This lasted all of the
year 1982. "
3) "Generalization of the guerrilla war and the begin-
ning of the creation of support bases, behind the
expulsion of the reactionary authorities. This
extended throughout the entire year of 19 83 and had
to face since the first moment the intervention of
the Army .
"
4) "Conquest of the bases of support, establishing in
them the power of the Popular Committees, and strength-
ening the militias and popular army. Expansion of
the popular army to new zones (including the cities
as an axuiliary activity) to obtain the dispersion
of the enemy forces. Reorganization of the produc-
tive process to place it at the service of the
popular army. This fourth stage is long and complex
and the PCP has divided it into numerous sub-stages,
each with specific tactical objectives. In the
final sub-stages the war will probably evolve into
movements of large combatant columns."
12
"La Guerra Popular Es una Guerra Campesina o No Es
Nada , " reproduced in Rogger Mercado, El Partido Communista






5) "Generalized civil war. The popular army will depart
the liberated zones to surround the cities. It is
probable that during this stage imperialist forces
will directly intervene. Insurrection in the cities
will complement the external siege. Complete des-
truction of the reaction, and the installation
throughout Peru of the Popular Republic of New
Democracy as the concrete form of the first stage
of the dictatorship of the proletariat . 13
The initial actions of Sendero Luminoso during the first
stage of its revolutionary plan covered a wide spectrum of
operations executed in the southern highlands region, particu-
larly in the department of Ayacucho. Sendero was able to
take advantage of the lack of a sufficient governmental and
security infrastructure to implement its strategy nearly
unopposed by the local police forces of the Guardia Civil.
Their armory was unsophisticated, consisting primarily of
weapons confiscated during attacks on police stations and
dynamite stolen from local mining centers. Dynamite was
frequently wrapped in balls of mud and slung from a huaraco,
a traditional Inca llama-half sling. Grenades consisted of
beverage cans filled with gasoline and topped with a make-
14
shift fuse.
These initial actions dealt almost exclusively with some
type of armed propaganda. The large majority consisted of
attacks on local government officials, destruction of
13 Raul Gonzales, "Especial Sobre Sendero," Quehacer
,
August 1984, p. 29
.
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electrical towers and bridges, and assaults on isolated
police posts and small centers of public administration.
Destruction and burnings at the local level were particularly
targeted against buildings where debt records were held.
Generally those debts were owed by the least favored strata
of the society. These early operations served a twofold
purpose. As the strategic document indicated, these gener-
ally uncomplicated maneuvers served as a training ground for
teaching militants the use of weapons on easily achievable
tactical objectives. Furthermore, the success of these
actions demonstrated the advance and consolidation of the
Sendero cause in spite of armed opposition from the Belaunde
government and vocal opposition from the political left.
During the early phase, Sendero columns utilized a
strategy of surprise, often going on the offensive at night.
Following the attack, the militants would take refuge in the
towns or return to their daily occupations, making detection
and capture difficult by a security force handicapped by the
lack of an effective intelligence capacity. Additionally,
the Senderistas were able to remain mobile and utilize the
geography and difficult terrain to their tactical advantage.
They were aided in the rural zones by the clandestine and
overt help of local citizens and by the lack of police forces
15
to pursue them.
Raul Gonzales, "Ayacucho: Por Los Caminos de Sendero,"
Quehacer
,
January 1983, p. 46.
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Sendero also engaged in methods other than destruction
and sabotage to further their cause. They won partisans
in the countryside by holding regular meetings at which the
guerrillas led indoctrination sessions, distributed food,
and established a system of "popular justice." The Sender-
istas would arrive at a settlement during the night and sum-
mon the citizens to the town square to accuse and punish
so-called "enemies of the people." Among these were alleged
child molesters, petty criminals, wealthy merchants, userers,
and cattle thieves. Sentences meted out to those deemed
guilty included public floggings, humiliating haircuts,
and even executions. Property was distributed, and debts
owed by the peasants were voided. Many peasants regarded
these incidents as the first public services they had ever
J C
received. The Senderistas passed their revolutionary
message by occupying radio stations and forcing transmission
of pre-recorded messages. Additionally, schools were occu-
pied while the militants explained the reasons for their
struggle to the students before departing.
It is obvious that the extensive preparation by the
Sendero Luminoso party prior to 1980 yielded high dividends
during the initial phase of the revolutionary process. In
the political realm, the Senderist ideology appealed to a
mass sector that had never benefitted under a democratic or
1 a
Bennet, "Corner of the Dead," p. 29
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military regime, and that had equally been abandoned by most
of the leftist sector. On a tactical level, this preparation
manifested itself in such things as the destruction of
electrical towers in places with limited access to normal
civilians, indicating a high degree of infiltration into
key strategic areas.
It is noteworthy to mention that these strategies were
principally employed '-in the lower elevations of the highlands.
The Indian peasants in the more remote villages of the higher
and less hospitable terrain rarely had contact with the Sender-
istas except when the guerrillas crossed the mountain passes
in transit to the valleys below. The great isolation, harsh-
ness of the climate and terrain, dispersion of the villages,
and the primitivism of the people weighed negatively against
indoctrination and building of support bases. The high zones
were utilized as secure transit corridors where the militants
could disappear after carrying out armed actions in Huanta
,
17
Tambo , and other locales.
A new phase in Sendero strategy was ushered in on March
2, 1982. In a well-coordinated military offensive, several
columns of revolutionaries attacked and subsequently held
the maximum security prison in Ayacucho. A total of 247
prisoners were set free, including a large number of suspected
terrorists. Prior to this incident, President Belaunde had
17 . . -Carlos Castro et al
.
, Informe de la Comision Investi -
gadora de los Sucesos de Uchuraccay (Lima: Impreso en Editora
Peru [1983] ) , p. 29.
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insisted that Sendero Luminoso was principally a group of
delinquents and criminals that could be handled by the tra-
ditional security forces. In response to the jailbreak, he
ordered the Sinchis, an elite counterinsurgency battalion of
the Guardia Civil, to Ayacucho. Without proper training,
unfamiliar with the local terrain, and lacking knowledge of
the Quechua tongue, the Sinchis also proved to be inadequate
for its assigned purpose. Numerous abuses of authority were
reported, resulting in the deaths of many innocent people.
Hostility and tension between the local populace and the
security forces increased, garnering support for Sendero.
This proved to be the high point of support for the movement
Official estimates placed the number of Sendero militants
18
at approximately 3000.
Sendero Luminoso has generally been unforgiving in their
operations against the security forces. In the "Let Us
Develop the Guerrilla War" document, Sendero specifically
addresses their attacks on police.
Actions which decisively blow the reactionary forces,
in its own contingent of people who like cannon fodder
are used for interests which are not exactly theirs;
actions which permit us to seize arms from the enemy,
the principal source of our armament, and fundamentally,
to deal hard blows to the morale of the state reac-
tionary apparatus and its contingent . 19
1
8
"Pocket of Terrorism Stirs Among Peruvian Peasants,"
Los Angeles Times , 20 February 1983.
19
"Desarrollamos la Guerra de Guerrillas," reproduced
in Rogger Mercado, Algo Mas Sobre Sendero (Lima: Ediciones
de Cultura Popular, 1983), p. 28.
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On at least some occasions when Sendero was able to conduct
successful ambushes against police patrols, the insurgents
often killed the officer in charge, while they let the troops
go free after confiscating their weapons and uniforms, and
requesting them to cross over to the side of the rebels.
While the officer would represent the incarnation of the
reactionary regime, the rank and file were pardoned from
execution as a tribute to their oppressed status.
The Sendero political leadership celebrated the second
national party conference between March and May of 198 2.
The initial goals of the revolution were acknowledged as
having been accomplished. The nation was notified that a
revolutionary group had taken up arms. Claims were made that
two companies of the People's Army were formed, and the
mandatory conditions had been created for the establishment
of future bases of support. Actions were to be taken to clean
and burn those areas of the countryside not yet under Sendero
control, to rid it of the political and economic authorities
of the state. This signified an increase in political execu-
tions and the greater use of terror against those peasants
20found to be oppose the revolution.
During this time, Sendero controlled vast amounts of
territory in Ayacucho and neighboring departments. As the
security forces began to increase the systematic use of terror
20 Raul Gonzales, "Especial Sobre Sendero," Quehacer
,
August 1984, pp. 19-20.
on the local populace, Sendero, somewhat illogically, followed
suit. Their use of terror undermined the sense of legitimacy
among the populace which they had successfully earned. In
terms of overall support for their cause, this change in
strategy was counterproductive. Local political authorities
were harassed with death threats. Many fled to safer terri-
tory; those that remained were often executed. Noted author
Mario Vargas Llosa states
,
The question is academic as to whether the peasant
population thus abandoned by the civilian authorities
were sympathetic to the Senderista detachments. They
obviously had no other alternative than to seek an
arrangement with the de facto power that had replaced
the fleeting power and, willingly or unwillingly, to
collaborate or at least coexist with it. 21
Within the peasant communities, the terror instigated by
Sendero members became intense. Liberated zones saw a dra-
matic upsurge in "people's trials" against suspected traitors
and informers. Varayoc , or Indian community leaders, were
whipped and paraded naked through their villages. Residents
were summoned and had their hair shorn, a humiliating gesture
within the local culture, as a warning against future
resistance. Elections were often disrupted by the burning of
ballot boxes. In some districts, Sender istas were known to
punish voters by cutting off the tips of fingers marked with
22indelible red ink at the polling station. A female youth
21Commission Report on the Murder of Journalists in
Uchuraccay . FBIS 6, March 1983, p. J4 .
22David Werlich, "Peru: The Shadow of the Shining Path,"
Current History
,
February 1984, p. 82.
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who witnessed a band of Sendero militants conducting a
"people's trial" offers this,
. . . They stood the boy in the plaza, calling him a
traitor and a coward. Then, in front of everyone, they
cut off his head with a knife. There was nothing that
we could do to save him. Five minutes later, one of
them yelled, 'Whoever does the same thing will receive
the same punishment! 1 Then they left, shouting
allegiances to comrade Gonzalo.23
Sendero also took concrete steps which directly came
into conflict with the economic survival of the peasantry.
The guerrillas attempted to restrict food production by
coercing the villages into economic self-sufficiency. Only
enough crops were to be grown to meet the needs of each
hamlet. The driving theory behind this was an attempt by the
revolutionaries to eradicate the money economy, and to
strangle the cities by starvation. Additionally, the Sender-
istas insisted on the closure of local markets where the
Indians traditionally sold their meager surplus in order to
purchase cocoa, macaroni, corn, and other necessary goods not
available to them by other means. The net result was a small
shortage in the regional cities of potatoes and local cereals
This was by no means catastrophic, in light of the fact that
80% of the cities' food needs are supplied from the coast.
The fact that some shortages of supplies did exist indicates
24
at least some success on the part of Sendero.
23 Jeanne DeQuine, "The Challenge of the Shining Path,"
The Nation , 8 December 1984, p. 613.
24
"Peru's Army Arrives in Guerrilla Area, but Communist
Rebels Well Entrenched," Wall Street Journal , 4 January 1983
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True to their word, Sendero embarked on an intensified
scheme of political assassinations. By mid-December 1982,
following the murder of four more local representatives,
President Belaunde reluctantly dispatched 1,500 Army troops
to act as a backup force to the Sinchis and other local
police groups. Belaunde had postponed this action as long
as possible. Sending in the military was, in effect, an
admission to the public of an ineffective counterinsurgency
campaign. The normal state apparatus was unable to effec-
tively deal with the Sendero threat, and the mounting prob-
lem was evolving into an internal menace to national security
Having been deposed in 19 68 by a military coup, the president
also feared the possibility of a future military intervention
in the nascent and struggling democracy.
By the end of their second year of armed insurrection,
Sendero enjoyed its most widespread support among the high-
lands peasants. During the first two stages of their cam-
paign, namely armed propaganda and sabotage, Sendero had
largely succeeded in convincing a segment of the populace
that it represented an alternative to the democratic regime.
This was accomplished by cultivating and enhancing an exist-
ing negative image of the state apparatus in the minds of the
peasantry while simultaneously legitimating its own claim
to power by providing what amounted to rudimentary social
services to a needy social stratum. Evidence of this sup-
port was demonstrated in mid-1982 by the overwhelming public
turnout of between 10,000 and 30,000 people in Ayacucho for
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the funeral of Edith Lagos, a young guerrilla commander who
died while in police custody. iMoreover, Sendero was success-
ful in organizing a general strike in the city of Ayacucho
on January 8, 1983. Aside from recruiting the support of
much of the hinterland peasantry, Sendero was able to build
a sizeable arsenal of weapons seized from the security forces
while concurrently training young operatives in strategy and
tactics.
As Sendero turned toward the increased use of terror and
coercion, however, it began to undermine and slowly erode
the base it had labored to achieve. Tactics turned from being
constructive to destructive in an effort to further demon-
strate the inability of the state to act effectively. While
this -followed a long range political strategy of the party
leadership, it did not respond to the actual needs of the
peasantry. Although Sendero was successful in achieving the
intervention of the military to demonstrate the weakness of
the government, this also placed the population in the cross-
fire between two diametrically opposed and equally committed
institutions using repressive means to achieve their goals.
In its efforts to attack symbols of the bourgeois state and
capitalist dependency, Sendero was equally as counterproduc-
tive, attacking institutions such as the agricultural experi-
mental station of the University of Huamanga and the Nestle
Company for their links with international capital. While
the university programs directly benefitted certain elements
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of the peasantry, many of the international companies in-
directly benefitted them as well by providing food for the
people during times of subsistence agriculture crises.
The perilous situation in Peru came to the attention of
the world in January 1983 with the murder of eight journalists
in the Andean village of Uchuraccay. A horrified nation
viewed live television coverage as the multilated corpses
were disinterred. As. Mario Vargas Llosa illustrates,
The bodies were -buried in pairs, face down, in the form
of burial used for people the Iquichanos [a local Quechua
ethnic community] consider "devils." They were buried
outside the community limits to emphasize that they
were strangers. (In the Andean beliefs, the Devil merges
with the image of a stranger.) The bodies were especially
mutilated around the eyes and mouth, in the belief that
the victim should be deprived of his sight so he cannot
recognize his killers, and of his tongue, so that he
cannot denounce them. Their ankles were broken so they
cannot come back for revenge. The -villagers stripped the
bodies; they washed the clothes and burned them in a
purification ceremony known as the pichja.25
The investigative commission appointed by the government
absolved the local security forces in the matter, and placed
the blame of the murders on the Indian villagers who mistook
the journalists for a band of Sender istas. The evidence on
which these conclusions were based was disputed in the trial
of several Indians accused of the murders. Photos taken by
one of the journalists prior to his death suggest that the
victims were not killed immediately. Furthermore, four of
those murdered spoke some degree of Quechua. Judge Hermenegildo
Ventura Huaya of the Ayacucho Superior Court believed that
25Mario Vargas Llosa, "Inquest in the Andes," New York
Times Magazine
, 31 July 1983, p. 47.
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the journalists were seeking and found a secret counterinsur-
gency operation, and that the armed forces killed them or
2 fi
ordered them killed to prevent disclosure. When Cesar
Elejalde became Fiscal de le Nacion (Prosecutor General), he
called in the Ayacucho prosecutor, Oscar Guerrero, for in-
structions. On March 27, 1985, the local prosecutor withdrew
the accusation against the peasant defendants, rendering the
proceedings moot. As- of September 1985, the case remained
27
at an impasse.
In March 1983, Sendero Luminoso convened the VIII Con-
gress somewhere in the Ayacucho jungle. Abimael Guzman was
in attendance with other principal leaders including Osman
Morote, Luis Kawata, Julio Cesar Mezzich, and Hildebrando
Perez Huaraneca. A strategic decision was made to deepen
the war and carry it into its fourth stage of conquering the
2 8bases of support and strengthening the military forces.
The Sendero vision of its bases of support in the rural areas
are explained in a December 1983 interview with a Senderist
prisoner at El Fronton prison.
They are zones in which the enemy (Army and police) can-
not operate. They cannot even approach them; they are
2 6
"In Peru, A Loss of Human Rights," New York Times
,
24 January 1985.
27 America's Watch Committee, A New Opportunity for
Democratic Authority (Washington D.C.: America's Watch
Committee, 1985), p. 22.
2 8 •»Julio C. Gaitan, "Congreso de Sendero: Abimael
Reaparece," EquisX, 11 April 1983, p. 4.
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small states controlled and administered by the com-
munities themselves through their organizations, but
under the leadership of the Party. As soon as a support
base is established, the administrative' bodies are
created. An educational program is initiated that is
based on instruction in the Spanish language, because of
its universal nature, on the learning of the four mathe-
matical operations: addition, subtraction, multiplica-
tion, and division, and on a knowledge of our true
situation. A universal literacy campaign is also being
launched. 29
The VIII Congress included a review of tactical doctrine
and the directions of- a future course in the revolution. A
debate in the leadership emerged regarding the use of summary
executions in the dispensation of popular justice. Osman
Morote proposed a temporary suspension, stating that the
communities tended to be victims of revenge waged by the
Sinchis. Additionally, the guilt of the executed parties was
sometimes difficult to prove. The opposing and victorious
position was stated by Guzman who maintained that the methodology
was necessary against traitors to the revolution, and as a
sign of the force of the New State.
In its analysis of previous aborted actions, the leader-
ship cited two principal causes. The first was the lack of
training and quality of a sufficient qualified operative
leadership (platoon leaders, column leaders, etc.). The
second reason was the deficient ideological indoctrination
of the militants, especially in the liberated zones. This
29 Interview with El Fronton inmates by Carlos Castro,
El Diario de Marka
,
16-17 December 1983. Translated in
Latin America Report, JPRS No. LAM 84-023, pp. 113-121.
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had resulted in numerous deserters and traitors to the cause,
the outcome of which was a peasantry subject to manipulation
by the security forces.
The Party leadership concluded the VIII Congress with
five resolutions. First, to retake the reoccupied zones to
show the power of the party. This was also justified on a
tactical basis in order to allow the "Red Army" free transit
in the theater of operations. Second, to extend the radius
of action to the departments of Lima, Junin, Cuzco, and
Apurimac. This was to create many "Ayacuchos" and begin the
fourth stage of the revolution. The third resolution was to
develop more active international contacts to evaluate the
possibility of external aid. Fourth, to conduct a concen-
trated and intense indoctrination of militants and sympathizers
Finally, to address the need for an improved communications
system to combine modern technology with the more rudimen-
tary and ancestral methods of lights, smoke, and couriers.
Four months later, in July 19 83, Sendero Luminoso convened
its Third National Conference to review the success of the
movement in the creation of the bases of support. The General
Plan of the construction of support bases had been put into
effect following the Second National Conference of June 1982.
The General Plan was divided into two principal phases of
preparing and sowing the land, and realizing the harvest. The
Julio C. Gaitan, "Congreso de Sendero: Abimael Reaparece,"
Equis X , 11 April 1983, pp. 4-6.
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first stage of the General Plan was subdivided into two waves
of Development, Defense, and Construction of the bases of
support, DDC 1 and DDC 2. The Third National Conference
was called to critique DDC 1 which had just been completed.
The results of DDC 1 were not considered to be entirely
satisfactory. This was due in part to tactical errors, but
more due to the increased repression of the reactionary
forces. The Senderis"t command was able to count 124 sup-
port bases in its clutches, although they had anticipated
more in previous theoretical projections.
In a positive retrospect of the success of the revolution
in general, the leadership of the party concluded that the
old power had been destroyed. The reaction had been caught
sleeping, and the Sendero actions had caused national and
international repercussions. A new order of power must be
constructed to replace the old based on six fundamental
principles
.
1) Giving attention to the problems of the masses.
2) Solving the problem of provisions.
3) The ability to safely live in a clandestine manner,
leaving five commisars (communists) in the
communities
.
4) Defining the priority sectors (poor peasantry) and
organizing them. From there will come the militias
and popular army.
5) Education of the masses, both children and adults, in
Marxism-Leninism-Maoism to fill the void of
Julio C. Gaitan, "Sendero Cerca Lima," Equis X , 2!
May 1984, p. 9.
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government abandonment of the peasantry. Emphasis
shall be on history, mathematics, and operations and
planning
.
6) Organize the masses so that they will remain healthy
and aid the guerrillas . 3-2
Following the Third National Conference, Sendero became
more active in the urban arena, conducting numerous electri-
cal blackouts and bombings in the capital city of Lima and
other population centers. In addition to its' Popular Schools
[clandestine centers for recruiting new militants] and the
operative cells, Sendero claims to have established so-called
"centers of resistance." These are secret militias in fac-
tories, universities, and slums, and originally consisted of
weakly trained and equipped urban guerrillas. The initial
urban Senderistas were platoons organized by trained insur-
gents from the countryside. • With a new emphasis on urban
operations, these guerrillas have become increasingly organized
and effective, and now participate in well-coordinated maneu-
vers. Their recent success in the mass bombings of February
1986 and the subsequent placement of Lima under a state of
emergency is a testimonial to their effectiveness and ability
to elude security forces in both the rural and urban sectors.
The growing effectiveness of Sendero Luminoso to conduct
simultaneous coordinated attacks in different sections of
32 Raul Gonzales, "Especial Sobre Sendero," Quehacer ,
August 1984, p. 22.
Julio C. Gaitan, "Sendero Cerca Lima," p. 8.
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the nation points to an improvement in their communications
network, a problem that had been addressed previously. It
has been reported that Sendero has acquired a powerful radio
transmitter which allows it to communicate with commandoes
in the north, central, and southern sections of the country.
The transmitter is of unknown origin, but is supposedly highly
sophisticated. The operatives are able to utilize receivers
confiscated in raids "against police stations in the Emergency
34Zone.
As the military became increasingly involved in the
counterinsurgency operations surrounding Ayacucho, Sendero
made good its promise to spread the fighting to other rural
regions. Although the military has apparently been success-
ful at lowering the capacity. of the guerrillas to act in the
Emergency Zone, the Senderistas have been successful at
opening a second front to the north. The guerrillas have been
able to exploit the bad state of landless peasants in the
region of Huanuco in a fashion similar to the strategy em-
ployed in the south. This has also had the psychological
boost of being able to operate successfully in an area con-
sidered to be solid APRA supporters under the government of
an APRA administration. " Sendero does not have the benefit
of having conducted extensive political work in areas of the




17 November 1985, p. 9.
35Aceveda, "Iminente Ofensiva Senderista," p. 9.
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north. This has led the Senderistas to adopt more repressive
rather than persuasive tactics in order to garner logistic
3 6
support from the civilian populace. Evidence supports the
fact that Sendero has recently opened a third front in the
department of Puno, located on the Andean plateau on the
border with Bolivia in the southeast. Sendero first appeared
there in 1982, attacking a local police station. Actions
then subsided, but re'sumed in force in January 19 8 6 with re-
peated attacks on peasant cooperatives. These cooperatives
are the site of nearly all of the productive land in the
region while 162,000 families in the department are landless.
The Sendero strategy is apparently aimed at pitting the
impoverished highlands peasants against those with better land
on the plateau. All three fronts are located in neglected
and impoverished areas with little infrastructure to allow
the effective deployment of police and military forces.
Theoretically, the Sendero political and decision-making
apparatus is structured about a national conference of con-
stituent members. This varies considerably with the actual
reality of the party due to the clandestine style of its
operation. In practice, all decisions are made by the National
Directorate or Central Committee which comprises leaders from
3 C
Americas Watch Committee, A New Opportunity for Demo -
cratic Authority (Washington D.C.: Americas Watch Committee,
1985)
, p. 27.
37FBIS 21 March 1986, p. J2
.
50
the five strategic zones. The nation is divided into the
southern (Cuzco, Sicuani, Puno, Andahuaylas) , central (Ayacucho,
Huancayo, Huancavelica, and predominant in terms of members
and leaders), southwestern (Arequipa, Tacna, Moquequa)
,
northern (Cajamarca, Piura, La Libertad) , and Lima zones.
A regional committee composed of province and district
representatives exists in each of the zones. Seats on the
National Directorate "are also reserved for members of the
branch responsible for order and discipline (control de
cuadros) and the military apparatus (brazo armado)
.
The Sendero military organization relies on a highly
vertical cell structure to carry out the military missions
decreed by the political sector. Each cell consists of less
than ten members, with five being the optimal strength.
There is one commander (responsable politico) who directs
the militant actions of the cell, and answers to the next
highest level of authority. Several members of this inter-
mediate stratum received training in China and North Korea
prior to the Senderista leadership fallout with the Chinese
leadership over the post-Mao succession and the deposition
38
of the "Gang of Four." With the exception of large offen-
sives, there is generally no inter-cell contact between mem-
bers. Each cell normally contains two explosives specialists,
one idealogue for political education, and one person respon-
sible for maintaining physical fitness and instruction in
38Taylor, Maoism, p. 14
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unarmed combat techniques. The cell commander is normally
responsible for weapon concealment and maintenance. All
members are trained in basic first aid, with one member
39
usually possessing more advanced medical skills.
The use of a rigid cellular structure as an organiza-
tional framework has been successful for Sendero. While the
cellular format is often considered a tool utilized by urban
guerrillas, Sendero has adopted it well in a rural sector
where the resources of the state would be limited and the
absolute necessity for secrecy and minimization of communi-
cations could be somewhat relaxed. One of the key elements
of the success of the movement has been the inability of the
Peruvian governmental and military intelligence network to
achieve more than superficial infiltration.
The Sendero military organization is headed by a Unified
Command. The hierarchy is separated vertically into companies,
40detachments, platoons, militias, and cells. The Popular
Guerrilla Army is composed of three main bodies. The Main
Force is mobile and in constant movement. This is comple-
mented by local forces installed in each town which remain
there permanently. Finally, a militia is said to be inte-




Tito Ercilla, "Sendero Se Confiesa," Equis X , 31
August 1982, p. 6.
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political sector is represented in the liberated villages
by a five-member popular committee supported by the local
•force and militia.
Sendero is highly selective in the recruitment of poten-
tial militants. Anyone wishing to join the organization must
be approved by at least two members. Sendero instigates the
recruiting process in order to avoid infiltration. After
selection, the initiate will spend at least one year partici-
pating in propaganda actions such as painting walls, publish-
ing pamphlets, and a host of analogous acts. During this
phase, the initiate is not permitted to participate in mili-
tary actions or to come in contact with the military apparatus.
Political indoctrination and instruction in guerrilla theory
are paramount in the education process. In general, the
initiate will begin to participate in low-risk military actions
such as the destruction of bridges and electrical towers be-
tween the first and second year of training. Training in
firearms, explosives, guerrilla strategy, and physical fitness
enhance the expertise of the individual. After this second
stage, a decision is made regarding final admittance. If
accepted, the person will swear an oath of allegiance in front
of four hooded Sendero representatives. If not, the train-
ing and association with the organization is halted. The
new guerrilla is then assigned to a cell with little personal
41Julio C. Gaitan, "Sendero Cerca Lima," p. 9
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knowledge of the structural hierarchy and knowing few other
members. Minimum contact among the members is enforced for
42
security reasons. Although Sendero is highly selective
in its recruiting practices, it is not sexually discrimina-
tory. Women frequently participate in militant activities
and several women count among top Sendero military leaders.
The net result of the Senderist organizational structure
has been to produce a'- body that is exceedingly difficult to
infiltrate. Because a large proportion of the recruiting
is done in the rural areas, the family backgrounds and his-
tories of potential members are easily checked. In addition,
Sendero is said to have the active and tacit support of some
disenchanted ex-members of the Guardia Civil who are experi-
enced in police matters and know the identity of potential
informers. Thousands of policemen have been discharged for
disciplinary reasons. It is rumored that Sendero has re-
ceived inside information that would be invaluable on a
tactical level from these elements. Additionally, Sendero
is likely to have infiltrated the police infrastructure during
the years of preparation prior to 1980.
In the Peruvian highlands, there has existed a tradi-
tional rivalry between the peasant populations in the barren
and harsh environment of the higher elevations, and the
communities situated in the more fertile and hospitable
42 Taylor, Maoism, p. 14
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valleys. The highlands peasant tends to view his counter-
part as a traitor to the Inca ethnicity by his adaptation and
acculturation to western civilization. The lowlands peasant
regards his complement as brutish and uncivilized. These
sociological tenets have not led to a polarization of inter-
ests, however. The highlands Indian relies on the lowlands
population to supply him with basic necessary provisions in
the marketplace, while the lowlands peasant still looks to
his counterpart in the sharing of traditional religious and
cultural festivals. The distinction between these two groups,
however, is important to emphasize because Sendero Luminoso
does not regard the two groups equally in its recruiting
efforts
.
The clientele that Sendero has traditionally sought to
mobilize has generally pertained to urban or peasant sectors
related to cities where propaganda cells were active. This
group would tend to be more easily rallied because of a
greater tendency to view their social problems in terms of
43pertaining to an exploited class. Because of their exposure
to a national infrastructure, these peasants of the lower
elevations would be more likely to regard their situation
from a nationalist point of view rather than allegiance - to
a particular ethnic identity.
Fernando de Trazegnies Granda, the Peruvian legal aca-
demician assigned to the Uchuraccay investigative commission,
43Castro, Informe, p. 96
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cites two reasons for the attraction of peasant youth to the
Sendero ideology.- First, the opposition of the youth to the
traditional gerontocracy and difficulties of social ascent
within the communal structural hierarchies. This opposition
is exacerbated by the growing desire felt by the young for
political and societal opening. Because of this, the young
tend to abandon their native communities to migrate to the
cities to work in low level jobs. This energy generated by
frustration is played upon by Sendero to garner support for
its revolution, and the geographical reality reflects that
the basic centers of Senderista support tend to be in valley
and foothill communities which adhere less to the traditional
44
structures of the highland communities.
In marked contrast, Sendero has. generally relied on the
communities in the higher elevations for nothing more than
logistic support to clandestinely transit from one valley
to another. The highland villages have been much more reluc-
tant to rally around the Senderist flag. The guerrillas often
impose their request for food and shelter by violent means.
Senderistas have frequently been known to steal sheep to
eat or to give to other communities. In the higher elevations,
sheep are viewed by the peasants as extremely valuable pos-
sessions. They are normally used solely for wool production,
44 Fernando de Trazeguies Granda, "Informe," in Informe
de la Comision Investigadora de los Sucesos de Uchuraccay
,
Carlos Castro et al . (Lima: Impreso en Editora Peru, 1983),
p. 133.
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and are only sold in the severest of economic crises. The
reputation of the militants as thieves is magnified by their
association with the distrusted inhabitants of the lower
elevations. The insistence by Sendero to burden these com-
munities with the closure of local markets and the imposition
of economic self-sufficiency has mobilized segments who are
often willing to form armed self-defense patrols in cooper-
ation with the government security forces in order to protect
their interests.
Enrique Valencia, a Mexican political scientist and
sociologist, has written that public documents published by
guerrillas can generally be classified into two principal
categories. The first is to proclaim the military actions
of the guerrillas and to publicize the triumphs of the guer-
rillas in confrontations with the regular army. The second
type is to make political proclamations to gain the sympathy
of the people and secure the support of the populace in aiding
the armed groups. The purpose of the first category is to
show by testimonial that counterinsurgency groups, in spite
of better combat preparation and logistic capacities, are not
invincible, and that the guerrillas can constitute an effi-
cient self-defense force of the base of support. The purpose
of the second type of document is to proclaim in a simple
and emotional fashion the reasons that a group has taken up
the struggle. It is an attempt to legitimize their use of
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violence and subversion in the revolutionary context.
Although Sendero rarely uses published documents for propa-
ganda purposes, the two principal pamphlets produced in 1982,
"La Guerra Popular Es Una Guerra Campesina o No Es Nada ,
"
and "Desarrollamos la Guerra de Guerrillas," combine both
elements of the Valencia typology.
Although working clandestinely since its beginnings,
Sendero managed to ma'intain a more or less institutionalized
contact with university students, urban" neighborhoods , and
peasant communities through a number of domestic political
organizations. These included the Movement of Classist
Working Laborers (MOTC) , the Feminine Popular Movement,
and the Coordinating and Unifying Committee of the Secondary
Student Movement (CCUMES). In Ayacucho , Sendero has worked
through the Provincial Federation of the Peasants of Huamanga,
the Federated Students. of the UNSCH, the Front for the Defense
of the People (FDP) , and the Unique Syndicate of the Workers
46
of Peruvian Education (SUTEP)
.
In an international context, although Sendero has been
accused of being financed and trained abroad, no hard evi-
dence has been produced to support the claims. Due to their
4 5Enrique Valencia, "Notas Para Una Sociologia de la
Guerrilla," in Algo Mas Sobre Sendero , Rogger Mercado (Lima
Ediciones de Cultura Popular, 1983), p. 102.
46 Piedad Pareja Pflucker, Terrorismo
,
p. 81.
ultra-left stance and a dogmatic and purist ideology, uncon-
firmed reports of such incidents as supposed Libyan assis-
47tance and training can probably be discounted. Sendero has
been tied politically to fifteen radical parties of different
countries. Most are relatively unknown, but all conform to
48
a common ideology of militancy and orthodox Maoism. Since
1982, a Senderist International Committee has been active in
western Europe directing a publicity system through pamphlets,
magazines, and books published clandestinely in France, Spain,
and the Netherlands. Several European organizations have
been identified, owing to a frequent number of publications,
as Sendero political branches. These include the Proletarian
Movement of Peru, the Amauta Intellectual Movement, the Move-
ment for Liberation in Peru, and the Jose Carlos Mariategui
49Artistic and Intellectual Front, among others. The most
overt and synchronized network appears to be located in
Madrid and Barcelona.
A discussion of Sendero ideology and strategy would not
be complete without a brief analysis of how the Senderist
tenets are inculcated into a rural peasant population rich in
a millenarian and messianic tradition. The Quechua Indian
47
FIBS 17 December 1986, p. Jl.
48
For more on this, see Raul Gonzales, "Especial Sobre
Sendero , " p. 25.
49Alberto Ku King, "Siguiendo la Pista de Sendero en
Europa," Oiga, 30 July 1984, p. 27.
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population of the Andean sector, descendants of the pre-
Colombian Incas , maintain their cultural beliefs of the past
in the modern era as demonstrated by their folklore, unique
practice of the Catholic religion, and traditional continua-
tion of the local political system which has been super-
ficially superceded by the imposition of a parallel official
state government apparatus.
The Andean conception of history and humanity was divided
into three successive eras. The first era, the time of the
Pagans, ended in mythical times. Although the Pagans con-
structed a powerful civilization, they had defied God and
were destroyed. The second era coincides with the Inca empire
and its destruction and subjugation at the hands of the
Christians. When this era is likewise destroyed, the Inca
king will return to initiate a third era of paradise and per-
fect life. This third era is, however, believed not to take
place before having a Day of Judgement, preceded by disorder,
immorality, rebellion, and fighting among men. Each humanity
coincides with the appearance of a new sun and solar age.
Perhaps not coincidentally , a local Quechua nickname for Com-
rade Gonzalo is puka-inti, or red sun. Millenarist beliefs,
with the associated destructive visions, have a rich history
in the Andes.
Fernando Fuenzalida and Juan^M. Ossio, " Informe Antro-
pologico," in Informe de la Comision Investigadora de los
Sucesos de Uchuraccay , Carlos Castro et al . (Lima: Impreso
en Editora Peru, 1983), p. 62.
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Nathan Wachtel, a French anthropologist and expert on
pre-Colombian culture, has studied modern Indian folklore and
how it relates to the native perception of the Spanish con-
quest of the sixteenth century. Indian folklore is relevant
because it conserves the memory of the past and provides
the vehicle for the transmission of a collective memory to
future generations. Today's Andean folklore is rich in ex-
pressing the agony of the death of Atahualpa, the last In.ca
king. Four centuries later, the tragedy of the conquest at
the hands of an alien culture remains a strong underlying
theme in the peasant mind. To a large extent, that foreign
culture has remained dominant, never seeking to incorporate
the Andean identity into the infrastructure and power centers
associated with the Europeanized urban centers of coastal
Peru.
A major Andean post-Conquest millenarian religious move-
ment took place during the sixteenth century. The sect
carried the name of Taqui Ongoy and coincided largely with
a successful Indian rebellion lasting several decades, and
ending with the death of Tupac Amaru at the hands of colonial
forces in 1572. Taqui Ongoy represented a rebirth of Indian
culture transformed and reoriented with a sense of revolt
and liberation. The beliefs rejected any cultural interchange
Nathan Wachtel, "La Vision de los Vencidos: La Con-
quista Espahola en el Folklore Indigena," in Ideologia
Mesianica del Mundo Andino
,




with the Spanish imperial society and actively sought to
terminate the domination. The religious tradition of the
Incas had been awakened to battle Christianity and evict the
conquerors from the Inca homeland. Millenarianism and mesian-
ism in the form of exalting the successful Inca military
leaders emerged when the entire existence of a native society
was questioned. The conquest had represented a complete
dismantling of the Indian world without a new restructuring.
The Taqui Ongoy responded to this crisis by providing a
collective mechanism and alternate vision to a threatened
• 4. 5 2existence.
The Indians of the Peruvian Andes continued their mili-
tant traditions well into the nineteenth century, playing
important roles in the battles for independence at the side
of the royalist forces. The Quechua tribes had an important
military hero in the form of Jose Antonio Naval Huachaca,
an illiterate Indian who rose to the rank of General. An
important Quechua group, the Ichiquanos, developed a superb
reputation as members of the Cavalry of Lancers of Santiago.
The troops, under the direction of local chiefs and armed with
traditional weapons such as clubs, slingshots, and bolos,
proved to be effective warriors. The women won fame as being
equally tenacious to men in the field of battle.
52Nathan Wachtel, "Rebeliones y Milenarismo , " in Ideologia
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Needless to say, many elements of the Sendero Luminoso
revolution ring more true to the Andean past than a Com-
munist future. The vision of the complete destruction of the
present Peruvian state and the subsequent rise to power of
a new and legitimate structure hark back to a millenarian
tradition and response of the traditional society to confront
a crisis. The descendants of the conquistadores have con-
tinued their oppression throughout the centuries. Abimael
Guzman as the charismatic leader of the new order and the
chief architect of the movement is revered much in the same
way as a rebellious Manco Capac or Tupac Amaru by his followers
Finally, Sendero does not rely on the sophisticated weaponry
of the twentieth century to carry out its militant actions.
Most are done with nothing more than dynamite accompanied by
more traditional arms such as the llama-hair sling. Equally,
Senderista women have achieved fame in the same manner as
their Ichiquana counterparts.
During the first six years of its proclaimed revolution,
Sendero has been highly successful in some ways while failing
to achieve its goals in others. In contrast to the ill-fated
revolutionaries of the 1960's, Sendero' s preparation, organi-
zation, impermeability, and clandestine operation have con-
tributed to continued success against a state and military
counterinsurgency campaign hampered by a lack of resources.
Following the 1982 turn to increased terror and political
violence, however, Sendero has eroded some of its recruiting
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base by failing to continue the actions which supported its
claims to legitimacy among the impoverished peasants during
the first two years of the armed struggle.
So far, the movement has not produced any semblance of
the worker-peasant alliance so prevalent in the ideological
rhetoric. Likewise, Sendero has failed to achieve the polari-
zation of the entire society into two extremes. The vast
majority of Peruvians have opted for the democratic alterna-
tive to the revolution. The Sendero campaign of sabotage has
not severely undermined the economic process, although some
inroads have been made. One example is the constant barrage
of electrical blackouts that Sendero has enacted on Lima and
other major cities. Although electricity is usually restored
quickly, long-term effects are beginning to be manifested.
The overall electrical system in some parts has been so inun-
dated with circuit cross-ties that the system as a whole might
only carry seventy percent of its fully rated capacity. While
this is not burdensome to the consumer, the effects on the
industrial production process are potentially devastating.
A true revolutionary situation would exist in Peru only
if the majority of the society opted for fundamental change
while the elites in power remained intransigent to these
demands. With the change from military rule to civilian power
in 1980, and the uninterrupted electoral transfer to a more
liberal administration in 1985, an intransigent political
elite has proved to be non-existent. In this context, the
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chances for a successful revolution led by Sendero Luminoso
appear slim. On the other hand, Sendero has proved itself
to be tenacious and impossible to easily eradicate. Its
ability to continue to inflict damage throughout the nation
on a lower than revolutionary scale appear to be a certainty
for a long time to come. This could provoke the government
into commiting mistakes, such as overreacting or underreacting
to the level of threat. An incorrect response to Sendero
Luminoso might ultimately culminate in a weakened perception
of legitimacy in the eyes of the public.
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III. THE COUNTERINSURGENCY EFFORT
The suppression of Sendero Luminoso by the means avail-
able to the Peruvian government, namely the national police
services and the military, has proven to be impossible during
the six years since the initiation of the armed insurrection
in 19 80. The counter-insurgency campaign has been hampered
by an assigned mission which, in the light of Andean reality
(given the nature of the opponent, the operational environ-
ment, and a lack of dedicated resources), is exceedingly diffi-
cult to perform. In many aspects, the army is deployed in a
region that, culturally and linguistically, can almost be
considered a foreign territory within the confines of sover-
eign national boundaries. With the army assuming full respon-
sibility for the counterinsurgency effort in the Emergency
Zone, that section of the country remains in a virtual state
of war against an internal rather than external power. In
the prevailing atmosphere, the ability of the government to
act decisively while adhering to the principles laid out in
the Peruvian constitution has been a challenge where lack of
success has claimed the lives of many innocent victims.
Efforts to reform the program and curb these abuses by the
Garcia administration have met with some resistance by con-
servative elements within the military that maintain Sendero
can only be eliminated by a more militant program, reminis-
cent of the Argentine example during the late 1970 's.
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The counterinsurgency endeavor can be divided into three
principal phases. It has evolved in steps of increasing re-
pression, responding to the success of Sendero in the Andean
highlands in spite of opposition by the security forces.
The first period lasted from the beginning of Sendero mili-
tant actions in May 1980 until 26 December 1982, when the
Belaunde adminstration placed the nine provinces of the Emer-
gency Zone under military rule. During this time, the only
forces employed were from the three national police institu-
tions and their corresponding elite counterinsurgency and
anti-terrorist units.
When the Army first deployed to the region in late 19 82,
it was assigned only to perform an occupation function in
regions that were not controlled by Sendero. The martial
activities involved in regaining lost territory in the rural
areas were still left to the police forces and the Sinchis,
with the additional support of the marine infantry. As these
forces continued to be unsuccessful, the Army increasingly
participated in joint operations, with further repression
and the use of deadly force becoming commonplace. The third
phase of the campaign was ushered in on 20 July 1984, when
the police forces were withdrawn to the cities, and the mili-
tary was given the sole responsibility of combatting the
guerrillas in the rural arena.
The evolution of the counterinsurgency effort has been
towards the use of greater force to accomplish the objective
67
of eradicating the guerrilla threat. The dispatch of the
Army redefined the Sendero problem from that of a police
action in the interest of maintaining internal order to one
of a true threat to national security. The emergence of
systematic militarized repression came into conflict with
democratic principles and freedoms established by the 1979
democratic constitution. The military intervention was
undoubtedly welcomed by Sendero, who viewed it as a legiti-
mization of their revolutionary apparatus. Additionally,
they believe that the repressive campaign against an already
oppressed and somewhat mobilized populace would serve to ex-
pand the Sender ist ideological appeal. Moreover, although
infringements on democratic freedoms would not be considered
relevant by a movement with such a radical and militant
philosophy, they are critical to the other elements of the
Peruvian left who rely on the democratic process as a vehicle
1
to power. For one thing the success of Sendero and the in-
creased role of the military forces to combat it might provide
an opportunity for the return of military rule to Peru.
Hence, one witnesses the denouncements by the political left
of both the revolutionary Senderistas and the forces of order
with their associated excesses of constitutional authority.
The responsibilities of the Peruvian security forces are
divided between three services that have traditionally been
Jose Maria Salcedo, "Sendero, Conciencia de la Izquierda?"
Quehacer, April 1982, p. 20.
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distinct and institutionally competitive. The main com-
ponent is the -uniformed Guardia Civil, which is assigned the
task of maintaining public order. The Guardia Republicana,
another uniformed body, assumes the duty of security in public
and penal institutions. The third component is the Peruvian
Investigative Police (PIP) , a non-uniformed group similar to
the United States Federal Bureau of Investigation, which
specializes in criminal investigations and intelligence
gathering missions. Additionally, each of the police services
contains elite units under their control which have been em-
ployed in the anti-subversive struggle near Ayacucho and, more
recently, in other areas. The most well known of these is
the Sinchi battalion, the anti-subversive unit of the Guardia
Civil. The Sinchis were the principal unit employed against
Sendero prior to the complete military assumption of power
in 1985. The Guardia Civil has also utilized a riot control
body to augment the regular police forces in the area. The
Guardia Republicana maintained troops from its own counter-
2
subversive squad, the Llapan Atic (Quechua for all-powerful).
The PIP has employed its own Directorate of Counterterrorism
(DIRCOTE)
.
That Peruvian police forces have a legacy of interservice
rivalry is evidenced by the replication of units among the
three bodies to perform similar or identical tasks. This
2Amnesty International, Peru Briefing (London: Amnesty
International Publications, 1985), p. 6.
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has been compounded by tension with the Peruvian military,
which' has viewed as a threat to their institutional exis-
tence the parallel rank structure and requests for, and for-
mation of, such paramilitary items as elite Guardia Civil
units of paratroopers. As a result, during the years of
military rule from 1968-1980, the national police suffered
from a severe lack of allocated resources. This was not
rectified under the Belaunde administration due to the im-
position of financial austerity measures, and by the presi-
dent's desire to placate the military. A noteworthy example
of the sad state of the police is evidenced by the fact that
when Alan Garcia assumed executive power in July 1985, the
police in the capital city of Lima only possessed twenty
two patrol cars to service a metropolitan population of over
six million. Rank-and-file members have been plagued by
extremely low salaries which consequently led to a high level
of corruption and an extremely poor image in the eyes of the
Bradley Graham, "Peru's Civilian Ruler Calls in Troops
to Calm Lima," Washington Post , 24 February 198 6. Other
figures citing the problems encountered by the police include
a ratio of one policeman to protect 600 citizens, compared
to ratios of 300 in Chile and 450 in Colombia. The patrol
area average of 43 square kilometers doubles the Chilean figure
of 21, and nearly doubles the areas of 25 and 27 square
kilometers found in Colombia and Argentina, respectively.
It is almost certain that Peruvian policemen share their arms.
The Guardia Civil had less than 20,000 revolvers to serve a
force bordering on 30,000 in 1982. Furthermore, much of the
ammunition was old, and not completely reliable under condi-
tions of live firing. For more, see Gustavo Gorriti Ellen-
bogen, "La Policia Frente al Terrorismo," Caretas , 19 July
1982, p. 23.
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public. Hence, the capability of the police forces to singu-
larly carry out an effective anti-insurgency campaign in the
early years of Sendero was seriously handicapped from the
outset. The police not only suffered from an unsavory
public image, but were more concerned with things other than
the performance of their professional duties. This was
prominently displayed during the 26 May 1983 mutiny in Lima
by several thousand members of the three police bodies.
Among other requests, the mutineers demanded higher salaries
and the implementation of an eight-hour workday. Addition-
ally, they called upon the government not to summon the
military to resolve the crisis, proclaiming, "now we are no
longer unarmed as we were on 5 February 1975," when a similar
occurrence took place.
By 1980, the capability of the police bodies to maintain
order even in times of relative calm was highly questionable.
More to the point, in no way was the security network pre-
pared to deal with the crisis situation presented by a well
organized Sendero militant threat. The ineffectiveness of
the normal Guardia Civil contingent in the Ayacucho region,
in concert with the early appeal of the Sendero ideology to
the peasantry, allowed the revolutionaries to occupy large
tracts of land abandoned by governmental and security repre-
sentatives. The government declared a state of emergency in
five Ayacucho provinces on 11 October 1981. During the first
FBIS, 26 May 1983, p. Jl
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sixty days, over 2,000 people were arrested, although few
of them proved to be Senderistas. Most were innocent peasants
taken into custody during a wide-sweeping dragnet operation.
PIP operatives fanned out posing as students, peasants, and
travellers in order to gain intelligence. None of the
measures were effective, and indeed, the program was more
counterproductive than beneficial. Rather than enjoying
the protection of the security forces, the population became
immersed in the crossfire between the police and the Sendero
movement. Many sought the Sendero alternative as the apparent
lesser of two evils. Although a state of emergency may only
be declared for sixty days under the Peruvian constitution,
constant renewal has maintained the region under this condi-
tion since the initial declaration. The situation fared no
better with the augmentation of the traditional units by the
elite counterinsurgency Sinchi batallion. By January 1981,
approximately 1,000 Sinchis had been deployed to the troubled
area. Further deterioration of the situation led to the dis-
patch of 400 additional troops by January 1982. The suc-
cess of the March 1982 Sendero-led Ayacucho jailbreak is a
testimonial to the unpreparedness of the customary institu-
tions to counter a new and committed guerrilla threat.
In a 19 8 2 document, Sendero Luminoso espoused their views
on the counterinsurgency operation, and how its obvious lack




What has the antisubversive operation shown? Simply
and plainly that the masses reject and resist the
aggression, that the brutality, excessive strength,
and reactionary violence does not repress them but, even
more, incites their just anger of class confrontation,
including unarmed hands against the aggressors armed and
protected by the armor of the state. It shows that
people help and protect the armed struggle, the guerrilla
war, that they sustain and defend it with their own
lives and that their understanding, heart, and will
exist because the guerrillas advance and serve for
their liberation.
6
Indeed, in the context of 1982, this statement by Sendero
cannot be totally dismissed as a fabrication of revolution-
ary rhetoric. The police had been forced to abandon many
of the outlying areas and retire to the cities, leaving
Sendero as the only de facto authority. In many instances,
the police bore little semblance to a professional force in
the performance of their duties. They were often drunk in
public, using weapons in a coercive manner to threaten, rather
than protect, the local citizenry. Published accounts cited
the security forces for such notable and numerous accusations
as robbery, extortion, and rape. In essence, the state
agents of crime prevention were overcome by their own crimin-
ality, leaving little hope for a traditional solution to the
growing Sendero menace. Another example of their gross
ineffectiveness took place in late 198 2, when Sendero attacked
and occupied Huanta, a city of 80,000 inhabitants, for twenty
four hours.
c
"Desarrollamos la Guerra de Guerrillas," reproduced in





Throughout the year of 1982, the police forces around
Ayacucho were forced into a defense posture by the success
of the guerrillas. The tactics employed by the police in-
cluded the occupation of strategic points such as key elec-
trical towers and microwave transmission points. This proved
ineffective, however, as evidenced by the ability of Sendero
to sabotage these points seemingly at will. Defensive tac-
tics were employed around police barracks, although Sendero
was still able to penetrate and successfully attack them.
The police also implemented a system to patrol the department,
including the use of combat-equipped helicopters. This, too,
proved inadequate at curbing guerrilla actions.
The obvious inability of the police to counter Sendero
forced a reluctant Belaunde on 21 December 1982, as a last resort,
to order the army into the area to participate in the campaign.
Five days later, an expanded emergency zone of nine provinces
of the Ayacucho, Apurimac, and Huancavelica departments were
placed under military rule. A political-military command was
created, headed by a general to administer the Emergency Zone
and coordinate the counterinsurgency effort by integrating
police, military, and civilian irregular forces. The Emer-
gency Zone has been under constant military rule in the
interim, and has been expanded to include nineteen provinces
throughout the region.
Raul Gonzales, "Ayacucho: Por los Caminos de Sendero,"
p. 46 .
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The reasons for the lack of police success in combatting
Sendero from 1980 through 198 2 are numerous. Lewis Taylor
cites five principal causes relating to the failure of the
security forces. Foremost was the lack of counterinsurgency
training, excluding the Sinchis, given to the bulk of the
Guardia Civil. Additionally, the police forces were con-
strained by the lack of efficient communications and transport
systems. This was a -'legacy of the twelve year period of mili-
tary rule during which the Guardia Civil was neglected because
of institutional rivalry and financial constraints. Further-
more, the resource problem had left the Guardia Civil under-
staffed nationally by at least 17,000 men. The police forces,
as a whole, are victims of poor morale and extremely low
salaries. Their discontent has been voiced in such demon-
strations as the Lima strike in 1983. Finally, the security
forces were hampered by the lack of an effective intelligence
network. From 1977-1980 during the transition from military
to civilian rule, Sendero was ignored by intelligence organi-
zations who concentrated on investigating those groups
creating urban unrest and organizing strikes. Because of
its non-participation in the electoral process, Sendero was
virtually ignored by the security apparatus. This situation
was exacerbated by the military, itself, since they returned
to the barracks in 1980 with all documents from the Ministry
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of the Interior, and were initially reluctant to share
8information.
The Uchuraccay commission attributes the police failures
to the nature of the struggle and the dilemma of a counter-
insurgency program regulated by the rules of a constitution.
The police were assigned an immense amount of territory to
watch over against an enemy without a defined front. Sendero
militants were able to hit and run, then disappear in the
midst of a population with which the security services, due
to language and cultural barriers, had little or no communi-
cation. The security forces were forced to choose between
paralysis under democratic law or combatting subversion by
9
violating the law. Survival dictated the choice of the latter
alternative.
The December 1983 creation of the Political-Military
command initially headed by General Clemente Noel Moral
marked the initiation of the second phase in the counterin-
surgency campaign. The proclaimed strategy of the army was
to occupy pacified and neutral territory while Sinchi patrols
and marine infantry were dispatched to zones that were un-
deniably under Sendero control. The military participated
in a variety of civic action programs, offering food, medical
attention, seeds, and protection to many rural villages.
gTaylor, Maoism
, p. 34.





The expressed strategy was to relieve the police forces of
superfluous duties in order that they would be free to more
effectively pursue the guerrillas. Although the initial
declaratory doctrine was one of military occupation and non-
intervention, the reality of the troop deployment was mani-
fested in the formation of joint army patrols with the police
forces, and a tremendous upsurge in the use of systematic
terror accompanied by secret detention centers, disappear-
ances, and extrajudicial executions.
Enrique Valencia has written that civic-military action
programs, such as the one employed in the Peruvian highlands,
are a Latin American invention born out of the counterrevo-
lutionary struggle. The construction of roads, health centers,
and other community development projects have been alternatives
to revolutionary thought. -Nevertheless, the existence of
these programs often exacerbates the fundamental problem by
exemplifying the better quality of life that is available in
the developed cities. These programs assume that equal social
and political values will be generated as a natural by-product
of the promotion of democracy and egalitarianism. This is
anything but automatic, however, and these programs may well
be self-defeating by further demonstrating the discrimination
and lack of parity of the historical past. Valencia concludes
by stating that although the intent of these programs may
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be genuine, the results of their implementation are often
counterproductive
.
Sendero expressed its perception of the armed forces in
the 1982 document, "La Guerra Popular Es una Guerra Campesina
o No Es Nada," in which it states, "The armed forces consti-
tute the spinal column of the state and in our country,
furthermore, they acquire—by virtue of the application of
yankee neo-colonialism— the connotation of a true 'native
army of occupation 1 ." In an August 1982 interview, a
Sendero militant also explained that Sendero had abstained
from attacking military targets to avoid provoking an inter-
vention. However, he went on to state, "If they do, and
they will, our combat methods will change radically and
qualitatively: mobility, hit and run, spreading out, and
multiplying by thousands the actions throughout the country.
12We are prepared."
It must be emphasized that the decision to deploy the
armed forces to the southern highlands was anything but
unanimous in the upper echelons of the Peruvian government.
Belaunde put off the decision as long as possible, fearing a
Enrique Valencia, "Notas Para Una Sociologia de la
Guerrilla," in Algo Mas Sobre Sendero , Rogger Mercado
,
p. 102.
Reproduced in El Partido Comunista del Peru: Sendero
Luminoso, Rogger Mercado, p. 30.
12Tito Ercilla, "Sendero se Confiesa," Equis X , 31
August 1982, p. 6.
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possible repetition of the events which led to his ouster
in 1968. Even the outgoing Minister of War, General Luis
Cisneros, expressed his doubts in a January 1983 - interview.
Cisneros stated,
I believe it is very necessary to explore any other
possible solution prior to deploying the armed forces:
this is the last option that remains to a government
to restore order in a country. We are going to assume
control of the zone and we are going to act, we are
professionals of war and we are prepared to kill: such
is war. I cannot tell a soldier, one who is trained to
kill: today don't kill. And if tomorrow, a problem
exists;" then can I tell him? We feel bad enough that it
must be done, but this shall not preclude us from doing
it once it is decided. 13
General Cisneros added,
In order for the police to be successful, they would have
to kill Senderistas and non-Senderistas , because that
is the only form that success can be assured. They kill
sixty people and at most there will be three Senderistas
among them. And surely the police will say that all sixty
were Senderistas . 14
This is a testimonial to the deficiencies encountered by the
police intelligence network to accurately infiltrate the
Sendero movement, in concert with public pressure to demon-
strate successes in the counterinsurgency program.
As the armed forces entered into the counterinsurgency
campaign, the words of General Cisneros would prove prophetic
Beginning in 1983, official communiques from the Ayacucho
Political-Military Command reported the killings of scores of
guerrillas. Figures from the Ministry of the Interior showed
Raul Gonzales, "Ayacucho: La Espera del Gaucho ,
"
Quehacer, January 1983, p. 56.
14 Gonzales, "Ayacucho: La Espera del Gaucho," p. 50
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that only two guerrillas were reported killed in 1981. This
figure rose to thirty eight in 1982, but skyrocketed to
1,435 in 1983. " This is especially noteworthy, because
official figures cited the peak strength of Sendero with
3,000 militants occurred at the end of 1982. If both of the
government statistics were accurate, one would expect to see
a dramatic decrease in the effectiveness of Sendero guerrilla
actions. This, however, was not the case, as militant actions
continued largely unabated in the Emergency Zone and spread
to other sections of the country, especially in Lima. Addi-
tionally, there was a parallel rise in figures in civilian
deaths attributed to the guerrillas. Three were reported in
1981, fifty six in 1982, and 433 in 1983. Over 1,200 civilian
1 6deaths were recorded in the first six months" of 1984.
While the tactics of Sendero Luminoso became more oriented
toward terror following the deployment of the armed forces,
it is much more likely that the majority of the civilian
deaths reported after 1982 occurred at the hands of security
forces. Although civilian executions by the guerrillas
continued, these continued to primarily be political in nature,
Large scale assassinations by the guerrillas rarely took
place, and were generally in response to village cooperation
with the security forces. Whereas the use of terror became
Amnesty International, Peru Briefing, p. 2
Amnesty International, Peru Briefing, p. 2
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more instrumental within their overall strategy, the wide-
spread upsurge of peasant deaths would clearly have been
counterproductive to the Senderist cause by further alienat-
ing their potential recruiting base.
In 1983, under the military administration and command
of General Noel, many official complaints were filed by citi-
zens of the Emergency Zone, citing the existence of clandes-
tine interrogation centers, extrajudicial political execu-
tions, disappeared suspects, and interference of official
Public Ministry investigations into these matters. In
spite of the declared policy of peaceful occupation by the
military forces, elements of the army and marine infantry
actively participated in repressive actions with the police
and civilian patrols. By early 1983, large numbers of arrests
were being made in the principal urban centers of Ayacucho
and Huanta . These were often made by groups dressed in
civilian clothes travelling in military and police vehicles.
In addition to not displaying any rank or official organi-
zational identity, these individuals were often hooded to
further conceal their identity. Security officials denied
The majority of the information in the following sec-
tion was taken from the following four sources. Amnesty
International, Peru: Torture and Extrajudicial Executions
(London: Amnesty International Publications, 1983); Amnesty
International, Peru Briefing , 1985; Americas Watch, Abdicating
Democratic Authority: Human Rights in Peru (Washington D.C.:
Americas Watch Committee, 19 84) , and Americas Watch, A New
Opportunity for Democratic Authority.
81
that arrests were made, and made no disclosure of the exis-
tence of detention centers.
Evidence presented to human rights organizations cites
the existence of at least eight clandestine detention and
interrogation centers in the Emergency Zone. The Guardia
Civil and the PIP were reported to cooperate in handing over
prisoners to Army and Navy officials for further interroga-
tion. The principal detention centers of the Emergency Zone
are the Los Cabitos army headquarters and the navy headquar-
ters at the stadium in Huanta . With the emphasis on a syste-
matic repressive strategy, security officials denied the
detention of many people in an effort to circumvent the law.
Under the Peruvian jurisprudence, if police acknowledge a
detention, the detainee must be released after a specified
period. For ordinary offenses, the person must appear before
a court within twenty four hours. In the Emergency Zone,
as well as throughout other areas where Sendero is active,
most prisoners are held under the anti-terrorist Decree Law
46. This allows for a fifteen-day detention of those sus-
pected of committing terrorist acts, although the detention
must be acknowledged. Under the Belaunde administration,
neither of these basic tenets were practiced in the reality
of the Andean sierra.
Detention victims have denounced the systematic torture
employed by the military and police forces at the interroga-
tion centers. Many were blindfolded for long periods and
82
held without food. Additionally, they were stripped naked,
watered down and beaten. Others have reported the use of
a tub filled with water in which their heads were submerged
repeatedly to the point of near suffocation. The PIP has
favored the use of electric shock treatment. The Sinchi
interrogators have also utilized this technique, along with
forcing the victims to eat sand and near suffocation with
plastic bags. Burning with cigarettes, fingernail removal,
and the rape and sexual abuse of women have also been
documented.
In addition to institutionalized torture, the security
forces have been active in the executions and disappearances
of suspected guerrillas. In 1983, the discovery of mass
graves and body dumping grounds became a regular occurrence.
Many victims are found naked with visible signs of torture,
killed by a single gunshot wound to the head. Furthermore,
the army has taken measures to preclude the accurate identi-
fication of the victims. Many are unidentifiable, found with
their clothing destroyed, their facial features mutilated or
burned with acid, their fingertips severed, and the bodies
disposed of in locations far from the detention centers
where the relatives are generally known not to travel.
Furthermore, security forces have participated in coercive
18 >Americas Watch, Abdicating Democratic Authority
Human Rights in Peru, pp. 139-140.
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prevention of families to identify victims until the bodies
19
are too decomposed for accurate identification.
These brutal tactics supposedly serve a double purpose.
First, because of a similar use of terror by Sendero, the
presence of a multitude of victims is designed to raise doubt
as to which side commited the abuse, thereby dissuading people
to side with the guerrillas. Additionally, the militants
will be reduced to their hardest core due to the state security
apparatus utilization of greater terror. The strategy of
terror, therefore, is applied on both military and psycho-
20logical levels. Most of the disappearances of Sendero sus-
pects occurred during 1983 and 1984. More recently, under
the Garcia administration, the armed forces have acted with
more restraint due to pressure from the president. From
testimony taken from earlier years, in order to disappear a
person with army knowledge, the intelligence service had to
be at least 9 0% certain that the suspect was a Sendero member.
For the marine infantry, noted for their zeal and excesses
in the counterinsurgency campaign, a 5% certainty was deemed
21
sufficient. Many urban disappearances and executions took
19Amnesty International, Peru Briefing
, p. 2; Americas
Watch, Abdicating Democratic Authority: Human Rights in
Peru
, p . 116
.
20Marlise Simons, "Peru Adopts Severe Tactics to Combat
Guerrillas," New York Times , 18 August 1984.
21Raul Gonzales, "Especial Sobre Sendero," p. 15.
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place among teachers and higher education students, thought
to be sympathetic to the Sendero cause.
In spite of the fact that Public Ministry officials are
legally assigned the duty of carrying out official investi-
gations of matters involving public protest, since late 1983
these representatives have repeatedly decried the obstruction
of their duties by police and military authorities. Although
the ministry is a separate and autonomous institution, it
is subordinate to the Political-Military command in the
Emergency Zone and must legally rely on the command for logis-
tic support. Prosecutors have been denied transport or
clearance to enter some rural zones, as well as access to
the detention centers. Military authorities have refused to
provide regular reports of arrests or prisoner transfers,
and formal communications petitioning information on specific
prisoners have gone unheeded. Nevertheless, some investi-
gations have been successfully completed, and the implication
of the military in severe abuses of constitutional authority
22has been proven.
Another important aspect of the counterinsurgency effort
has been the formation of rondas campesinas, or peasant patrols,
22Americas Watch, Abdicating Democratic Authority: Human
Rights in Peru
,^
pp. 149-153. The situation has improved
under the Garcia administration. The military has been held
accountable for its actions, as evidenced by the September
1985 dismissal of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
for the implication of military members in the mass deaths
of peasants in the highlands
.
which serve as an indigenous community self-defense force
designed to augment the military and police security effort.
Testimony presented to Amnesty International suggests that
these patrols were formed throughout much of the Emergency
Zone only after the establishment of the Political-Military
Command in Ayacucho. The command ordered community leaders
accountable to the regional command to mobilize citizen forces
By June 1983, many of these patrols were acting in conjunc-
tion with uniformed security forces in the provinces of
Huanta , Cangallo, and Victor Fajardo. By early 1985, a large
majority of rural settlements possessed civil defense teams
whose members stood guard at night and served as guides for
army patrols. Communities refusing to form patrols were
subject to close scrutiny by the military. Prior to 1984,
the military denied the existence of these patrols. After-
ward, the command authorities denied any role of the military
in creating the groups, stating that any such participation
was not permitted by the Constitution, and that the communi-
ties had taken action by their own initiative.
Most membership in the patrols is involuntary. Community
members who refuse to join are suspected of being Sendero
sympathizers. Males between the ages of twelve and sixty are
inducted, and women sometimes join the ranks as well. The
patrols, for the most part, are not allowed to use firearms.
Members arm themselves with traditional weapons such as
spears, clubs, knives, hatchets, and slingshots. The rural
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patrols consist of up to 250 members, and the group leaders
are generally appointed by the security forces. Established
training camps can accommodate several patrols at one
23
time.
All eligible community members are expected to share duty
in the patrols. They often deploy in periods ranging from
three days to two weeks. The encouragement of patrol formation
was initially to help the armed forces maintain some type of
security presence in the many remote villages accessible only
by mule or on foot. Local patrols, however, were soon par-
ticipating in actions at considerable distances from the base
community. They were authorized and instructed by military
authorities to detain anyone suspected of guerrilla involve-
ment, and in some cases, to execute them. Using this as a
cover, community militants carried out raids against rival
villages in an atmosphere of legitimized violence. Immunity
from criminal prosecution fostered the growth of bellicose
acts between communities with traditional rivalries. Al-
though the army rewarded villages with civil defense forces
by distributing such needed items as food and seed, remuner-
ation often came in the form of booty seized during these
intercommunal raids. Rather than help counter the guerrillas,
the formation of peasant patrols added an additional element
of violence to a turbulent situation.





The mobilization of these security forces added to the
escalatory violence already present in the Peruvian sierra.
Although government sources frequently claimed that civilian
patrols were successful in impeding Senderista attacks,
they often accomplished nothing more than to increase
community rivalry and violence in a rural population already
placed in a crossfire between the government forces and the
Sendero guerrillas. 'From a military standpoint, the peasant
patrols were designed to counter the guerrilla threat in
places where the security forces were not able to maintain
a continual presence. The implementation of this program,
however, took place without a cultural appreciation of the
peasantry and the problems which' might occur when violent
behavior was semi-legitimized in a region with a tradition
of ethnic rivalry. As Simon Palomino, prosecutor for the
provincial capital of Huanta , stated,
The violence is feeding on itself. These forces go
to another community and start looting and committing
abuses. So the other community will organize just to
protect itself in these local rivalries. Then the
Shining Path will attack both places just for organiz-
ing themselves. Then the army comes looking for the
Shining path. It goes on and on. 24
Indeed, a true sense of neutrality in the Sendero Luminoso
rebellion is a luxury that few rural peasants have been
able to achieve.
In January 1984, General Adrian Huaman Centeno replaced
General Clemente Noel Moral as the head of the Political-Military
24 Jackson Diehl, "Villagers Want Out of Conflict,"
Washington Post, 28 February 1985.
Command of the Emergency Zone. Huaman was more culturally
sensitive to the highlands situation, as he was a native
Quechua speaker born in the department of Apurimac, in close
proximity to the Emergency Zone. During his short tenure,
he directed a hurriedly conceived, though ambitious develop-
ment program. Perhaps his experiences and emotional sympathy
with the peasants of the region caused Huaman to overstep
his professional bounds and publicly criticize the Lima
government for not supporting his initiatives. These declara-
tions would cause his removal from the command a short time
later
.
In a 27 August 19 84 interview with the La Republica news-
paper, General Huaman criticized the government for its delay
in providing an extra fifteen million dollars in development
funds for the Andean provinces. He stated,
I told the peasants that I was going to help them as soon
as I received the wherewithal; that I was going to re-
ceive 70-100 billion soles [promised by the government]
,
but nothing happened. Perhaps everyone has forgotten
about those billions.
Huaman added,
The solution for Ayacucho is not military, but the
reversal of 160 years of abandonment. Here the solution
is not military, because if it were, if the issue were
to kill everyone in Ayacucho, I could solve it in half
an hour. ... We are talking about human beings, about
forgotten people who have been making demands for 160
years without getting anyone's attention, and now we
are reaping the results.
The general also complained about poor administration, lack
of apportioned resources to the region, the centralization
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in Lima, and that what small resources are invested in the
region go to the urban areas, and not to the rural zones
25
where they are most badly needed.
The following day, the Joint Staff of the Armed Forces
released a communique which relieved General Huaman and
named Colonel Wilfredo Mori Orzo as his successor. General
Huaman placed the military high command in a situation with
no other option. The Belaunde administration was so eco-
nomically constrained that allocation of the requested funds
to Ayacucho was impossible. Furthermore, Huaman ' s decision
to make his criticism public exceeded the professional cri-
teria of a military officer to obey orders without criticizing
his superiors. Finally, Huaman ' s commentary was an admission
of the military failure to overcome the guerrillas. His
criticism of the historical legacy in the Peruvian highlands
essentially was in agreement with much of the rhetoric of his
adversaries
.
Indeed, the official announcement of the failure of the
joint military/police counterinsurgency effort preceeded the
replacement of Huaman by one month. Prior to July 1984,
the counterinsurgency operations were in the hands of the
police or the marine infantry which were subordinate to the
authorities of the Political-Military Command. Within the
Emergency Zone, all judicial and civil authority came under
25
FBIS, 29 August 1984, p. J2
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the control of the military, despite mandates of the Consti-
tution that prohibited such subjugations of civil authority.
During the course of the counterinsurgency campaign following
the 1983 deployment of the military, the army consistently
blamed the police for excesses and atrocities. The police
countered by emphasizing their sacrifices and citing the
numbers of men that they had lost in the struggle against
Sendero. On 20 July.-1984, an official government communique
not publicly released withdrew the police forces to the cities
and left the military forces in complete charge of the anti-
subversion effort. The document officially gave the Armed
Forces Joint Command the authority to exercise certain func-
tions previously held by the Department of the Interior.
Specifically, the military assumed the authority to direct
both military and police counterinsurgency forces, and was
given the power to "plan, execute, and control" government
2 fi
actions against subversion throughout the country.
Raul Gonzales has postulated that a major Sendero escala-
tory offensive from 23 March to 7 August 19 84 was designed
specifically to provoke a full intervention by the military.
The reasons are threefold. Sendero would obtain a status
that it does not actually merit in terms of constituting a
true threat to national security. Additionally, the Army
is largely trained for a formal conventional war while the
2 fi





Sendero militants are trained for irregular military actions.
The army, therefore, would not necessarily gain by the physi-
cal occupation of territory. Therefore, in order to be
effective, the military must intensify the use of indiscriminate
repression, disappearances, and summary executions. This is
precisely what the Senderistas desired. The government,
forced into utilizing increased repression in the absence of
other alternatives, would find it difficult to receive sup-
port among the peasantry by voicing praise over the rights
and guarantees of the individual under a democratic institu-
tion. By seeing the disparity between government rhetoric
and everyday reality, the peasant would opt for the revolu-
27tionary alternative.
The authority of the military was further strengthened
with the passage of Law 24,150 on -6 June 19 85 regarding the
regulation of the state of emergency. This established the
legal criteria for the Political-Military Command held by
an officer appointed by the president at the proposal of the
Joint Command of the Armed Forces. The power to control
internal order included: 1) coordination and supervision of
government agencies, especially those rendering public ser-
vices, and 2) the appointment, transfer, or removal of
political and administrative authorities due to their impair-
ment or inability to perform specific functions. In a
27 Raul Gonzales, "Especial Sobre Sendero," p. 11
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significant motion, Article 10 of the law specifies that all
military and police personnel serving in the region under
the state of emergency are subject to the Code of Military
Justice. The violation of the code when in the line of duty
subjects the party to military rather than civilian jurisdic-
tion. The critics of the law maintained that it merely
provided a legal basis for the exceptional powers already
employed by the military, and succeeded in preventing its
passage during previous attempts in the legislature. It
was successful in the final attempt due only to the support
of APRA, whose party had emerged victorious in the presi-
dential elections and was waiting for Alan Garcia to assume
power in July.
During his inauguration address, the new president called
for major reforms in an effort to improve the campaign against
Sendero Luminoso. An extensive reform of the police forces
would be necessary in order to rid them of corruption and
unify them under a single command structure. The new
administration would exercise a greater role in funneling
needed development funds to deserving areas. The military would
be called upon to assume responsibility for its abuses of
democratic and constitutional authority. Finally, a Peace
Commission would be created in order to seek alternative
solutions to the Sendero problem.
Although the proposed reforms were sweeping in nature,
their implementation has done little to extinguish the success
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of Sendero Luminoso. In September 1985, Garcia dismissed
three top military officers because of military involvement
in a series of peasant massacres. These included General
Cesar Enrico, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and
Generals Sinesio Jarama and Wilfredo Mori, the two top offi-
2 8
cers in the Ayacucho Emergency Zone. Many ranking police
officials have been relieved, although the success of the
lower echelons to combat the guerrillas in the urban and
rural population centers has remained essentially unchanged.
Development funds, although welcomed, are far from sufficient,
since President Garcia is strapped by the same financial
crisis that plagued his predecessor. The Peace Commission
has also been ineffective, as Sendero steadfastly maintains
its revolutionary stance of refusing to participate in any
political dialogue, and denounces the present administration
as a continuation of the previous fascist governments.
Peruvian troops have continued to be trained by the mili-
taries of other nations. Following Garcia 's inauguration, a
235-man joint service contingent of United States military
units participated in a counterinsurgency training exercise
29
which lasted eleven days. In the past, Peruvian officers
2 8Michael L. Smith, "Andean Peasants Killed, Peru
Military Admits," Washington Post , 19 September 19 85.
29
"U.S. Quietly Trains Soldiers in Peru," Miami Herald ,
24 August 1985.
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participated in interrogation and intelligence courses in
Argentina, complemented by visits to Peru by Argentine counter-
. , . . 30insurgency specialists.
Under President Belaunde, the government program to com-
bat the revolutionaries of Sendero Luminoso has evolved in
three different stages, each more repressive and all-encompassing
than the last. From 1980-1982, coinciding with a lower level
of Sendero militant actions, the problem was defined as solely
a police matter. However, the local forces, due to a lack
of resources and professional behavior, soon found themselves
on the defensive against a much more prepared and dedicated
adversary. The army, therefore, entered the situation in
force beginning in 1983, and was assigned the responsibility
of administration of the Emergency Zone under the auspices
of a Political-Military Command. Although the actual counter-
insurgency effort was to be continued utilizing only Sinchi
forces and marine infantry patrols, regular army troops were
soon participating in clandestine interrogations and extra-
judicial executions, as well as in publicized community
action programs. The complete failure of the police to con-
trol the Sendero threat was officially heralded in June 1984,
when the Army was granted full responsibility for the counter-
insurgency effort. The program has also taken a new direction
under the new administration headed by President Alan Garcia.
Marlise Simons, "Peruvian Military Fights Terrorists
With Terror," New York Times , 2 September 19 84.
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Rather than continuing the secrecy and denial practiced by
his predecessor, Garcia has chosen to enact sweeping reforms
in an effort to remove corruption of the police forces, make
the military accountable for its actions, and seek alterna-
tives to a total military solution to the Sendero question.
While Garcia' s endeavors may be lauded by his appreciation
and protection of democratic principles, it is necessary to
examine the success, .'or lack thereof, of the anti-subversion
program under his control. Success should entail a decreas-
ing trend of military abuses of authority and Sendero actions
in the Emergency Zone. In one respect, the pacification of
the southern highlands can be termed at least partially
successful after a long and bitter struggle as the Sendero
actions have recently shown a steady decreasing trend. On
the other hand, Sendero has proven adept at modifying its
tactics, and has created severe problems in other sections of
the country, including the capital city of Lima. The fact
that Lima was placed under a state of emergency in February
1986 for the first time since the democratic transition in
1980 attests to the ability of Sendero to effectively counter
the military efforts to eradicate it. Sendero has proven
to be resilient in the face of an increasing amount of dedi-
cated resources allocated to control it, and has possessed
the foresight to modify its tactics when they have not proven
effective. In this context, Sendero will never be a push-
over adversary similar to the foquista insurgents of the 1960's
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It is obvious that the Sendero problem cannot be answered
by a total military solution, especially under a democratic
regime dedicated to protecting the rights of the individual
guaranteed by the constitution. The crux of the matter lies
in how to rectify the total resource shortage while concur-
rently modifying a historical tradition of extreme centrali-
zation that has left the Peruvian urban power centers virtually
isolated from the underdeveloped rural areas of the nation.
While the ultimate objective of Sendero* Luminoso is the revo-
lutionary assumption of power, and therefore political, the
government objective throughout most of the campaign has been
eradication, a military solution. Garcia has attempted to
rectify the situation, to some extent, in order to place the
government on the same political field of battle. Although
Sendero does not appear to present a major challenge for power,
it has demonstrated the capacity to maintain a militant
stance that will continue to extract a painful toll on the
country. In order to succeed, Garcia and his successors must
ultimately prove to a destitute rural peasantry that a demo-
cratic government is a superior alternative to the revolution-
ary choice juxtaposed against it, and better than the most
recent authoritarian experiment.
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IV. THE GOVERNMENTAL PERS PECTIVE
While the inhabitants of the southern highlands of Peru
have suffered from four hundred years of being largely ignored
by the colonial and national powers centered in Lima, only
in the past twenty five years have the attempts and failures
of rural reform projects led to the rudiments of peasant
mobilization in the political process. With regard to
Sendero Luminoso, it is necessary to briefly review the
changing regimes, administrations, and policies from the
election of Fernando Belaunde in 1963 to the present govern-
ment headed by President Alan Garcia. The past two decades
have witnessed both military and civilian regimes covering
a wide range of the ideological spectrum. Nearly all of these
share one central theme: plans for national development which
have been stifled by a scarcity of allocatable resources due
to a burdensome foreign debt, and the inability of the existing
economic mode of production to generate sufficient earnings
to overcome it. The difficulties faced by these Peruvian
governments coincided with the emergence of Sendero Luminoso,
which declared that regardless of any particular ideological
affiliation, they were but a continuum of fascist regimes
committed to the eternal subjugation of the Indian peasantry.
Hence, from a governmental perspective, the examination of
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the past twenty six years provides a framework for analysis
,of the success of Sendero, the rural development policies and
aborted plans of the different regimes, and the possible
future course of the Peruvian polity.
President Belaunde Terry was elected in 1963 on a reform
platform with the blessing of the military and with high popu-
lar expectations. Throughout much of the country, there
existed an atmosphere of optimism for anti-oligarchic and
nationalist transformations. Unfortunately, the president
quickly encountered obstacles. Belaunde 's Popular Action
party did not enjoy a majority in the national congress. His
legislative proposals were opposed by a strong coalition led
by APRA and the Odria party. Equally important was the
question of an acceptable political resolution of the Inter-
national Petroleum Company (a subsidiary of Standard Oil)
dispute over subsoil mineral rights in the northern coastal
region. In fact, the United States withheld government loans
The Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana, or APRA,
is a social democratic party founded in 19 24 by Victor Raul
Haya de le Torre. Its first electoral success at the^national
level occurred in 1985 with the election of Alan Garcia.
The Odriistas, on the other hand, were a conservative party.
It was named after General Manuel Odria who assumed power in
a 1948 military coup and ruled for eight years. His revolt
put an end to the uncertain, but mildly reformist, govern-
ment of Jose Luis Bustamente and reemphasized the traditional
conservative coalition between army officers and wealthy
civilian elites. The coalition was initially established
in order to elect parliamentary officers, while each party
claimed that it would independently pursue its own legis-
lative programs. Nevertheless, the two parties consistently
united in efforts to frustrate the administration.
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pending a successful conclusion to the problem. These
political and financial difficulties forced Belaunde to re-
ject tactics of popular mobilization and to seek alternative
methods to implement his planned reforms.
In response to political opposition to these programs,
the executive branch obtained large loans to finance those
projects which the Congress would not approve. Unfortunately,
this took place at a 'time when substantial price drops
occurred in international markets for traditional Peruvian
exports. Inflation and drops in production ensued, followed
shortly thereafter by a devaluation of the Peruvian sol against
other foreign currencies. Belaunde had campaigned on promises
that the national currency would retain its strength in the
international marketplace. The devaluation, therefore, had
significant psychological and political impacts, as well as
the obvious financial side effects.
Due to these spiraling economic difficulties, the Belaunde
administration found itself unable to finance its various
intended reformist and developmentalist campaigns. This
resulted in the beginning of a series of disappointments for
the disenfranchised peasantry and other groups around the
country, and added to the mobilization within Peruvian
society of an emergent political left. Morevoer, the liberal
Apristas lost their traditional political hold on the uni-
versities throughout the country, while the "New Left" rose
to take their places. Radical ideologies became increasingly
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popular, with the Cuban Revolution serving as a model for a
series of foquista-inspired insurgencies in 1965. However,
these guerrillas, composed primarily of students, proved
no match for the military, and were easily suppressed by
January of 1966.
The increased politicization of the rural population and
the arrival of revolutionary philosophies underscored the
need for agrarian reform and the integration of the peasantry
into the national society and economy. Although the Belaunde
administration attempted to implement agrarian reform, the
results never achieved the level of hopes generated by popu-
lar expectations. From 1963-1968, less than 20,000 families
throughout the country received title to expropriated land.
In the department of Ayacucho , only one expropriation. took
2place, and a mere fifty four families became beneficiaries.
During the mid-19 60' s a number of small scale development
programs were initiated in the department of Ayacucho. These
were funded and staffed by such organizations as the Alliance
for Progress, Food for Peace, the United States Peace Corps,
and a domestic corollary known as Cooperacion Popular. During
this time, the first all-weather road connecting Ayacucho
to the coastal city of Pisco was constructed. This greatly
facilitated the efficiency with which people and materials
2David Scott Palmer, "The Sendero Luminoso Rebellion in
Rural Peru," in Latin American Insurgencies , ed . Georges
Fauriol (Georgetown University: Center for Strategic and
International Studies, 1985), p. 78.
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could be transported to the southern highlands, thereby
bringing the city closer to the mainstream of Peruvian daily
life. Telephones were brought to Ayacucho in 19 64, and the
communication network expanded in the following years to
include other urban centers in the region. The result of
these actions was to make a large segment of the hinterland
population feel that some semblance of modernization and
development had at long last come to the area, and that the
central government cared something about the rural periphery
of the nation.
Even so, by 1968, the military viewed with increasing
alarm the political and economic crisis that plagued the
nation. Due to political opposition and financial problems,
the Belaunde administration suffered from a loss of legitimacy
in the eyes of the public, especially given its inability
to deliver promised reforms. Furthermore, the government
was viewed as highly corrupt. As a result, the military
intelligence establishment became convinced that fundamental
problems were being ignored by a weak civilian government
unable to act decisively under the political process of a
democratic regime. Additionally, the military believed that
the Belaunde government was unable to handle a surge of up-
risings which constituted a threat to national security.
Within the armed forces, the experiences of the ranking mili-
tary officers in quickly surpressing the guerrilla insurgen-
cies led to an associated sense of institutional self-esteem
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and self-confidence. Yet another incentive for the military
to intervene came during the early preparations for the 19 69
elections. For the first time, APRA was maneuvering to win
both the presidency and a congressional majority. The mili-
tary and APRA had been traditional political rivals for decades,
and the Apristas had frequently sought to undermine the mili-
tary in an effort to increase its own political power.
The military was .-afforded a legitimate opportunity to
intervene after a badly mishandled negotiation of the highly
volatile IPC issue. Already accused of high-level corrup-
tion, the administration publicly bungled the settlement when
page eleven of the document, containing the agreement on the
sensitive financial arrangements, was reported as missing.
A huge political scandal ensured amid speculation that the
Belaunde administration had sold out on an item of national
interest. At the invitation of many public sectors, General
Juan Velasco Alvarado led a military coup d'etat on 3 October
1968. General Velasco and his supporters proposed a reformist
alternative to the civilian elected regime. In expressing
its desire to remain in power over an extended period, the
Velasco government intended to welcome modern capitalism to
Peru at the expense of the traditional oligarchic elites. After
a year of transition to establish legitimacy with the general
citizenry as well as within the military ranks, Velasco
3 David Scott Palmer, Peru: The Authoritarian Tradition
(New York: Praeger Publishers, 1980), pp. 68-98.
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embarked on a series of measures which included one of the
most sweeping attempts at agricultural reform in Latin
American history.
The 1968 coup coincided with a series of United States
government aid cutbacks leading to the termination of many
of the development projects in the southern highlands. This
was to have two important ramifications. First, the rural
population found that its hopes and rising expectations of
development with the central government and international
agency assistance had vanished. More important was the in-
crease in relative importance of the official and unofficial
projects of the University of Huamanga in the countryside.
The elimination of the federal development programs paralleled
the rise of outreach and extension programs of the university.
Concurrently, key political positions within the university
were coming under the increased control of persons affiliated
with radical ideologies, including many future Sendero members
Thus, the efforts of these pre-Senderistas to promote their
revolutionary vision among the peasantry was greatly facili-
tated by an institutional vehicle (the UNSCH) engaged in
developmental schemes with a pre-conditioned peasantry.
Sendero 's success in achieving bases of support in the country-
side dates from this period, especially among the Indian
communities of the province of Cangallo. As early as 1971,
Sendero was able to exert sufficient influence over a group
of communities in the Vischongo-Vilcashuaman area of Cangallo
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to repel by force, if necessary, agrarian reform representa-
4
tives of the Peruvian government.
The Velasco regime, from 1968-75, attempted to modernize
the country by increasing state participation in the economic
process. One of the side effects was a marked decrease in
private investment, leading the government to seek capital
from foreign banks and lending institutions. The heralded
Agrarian Reform Law was passed on 24 June 19 69, marking the
beginning of the second phase of the military-radical govern-
ment. Ideally, the results of these reforms would have meant
an expansion of agricultural and livestock production, thereby
creating a cheap food source for the urban masses. In theory,
a reduced reliance on imported food would free additional
capital to be invested internally. This would lead to in-
creased demand for manufactured goods, which in turn would
create increased revenues for the state and industrial bour-
geoisie. The ultimate benefit of these new policies would be
the increased integration of domestic agriculture with the
industrial market.
Although the intent of the agricultural reforms was
grandiose, its net effectiveness was much more limited.
There was a spectacular emphasis on the redistribution of
property, but not of income. Sixty percent of the population
emerged empty-handed, while the fundamental rules of the
4David Scott Palmer, "The Sendero Luminoso Rebellion in
Rural Peru, " p. 81
.
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economy essentially remained unchanged. The government
effected the transfer of over 10,000,000 hectares of hacienda
land to 340,000 families. Peasant families, however, numbered
1,200,000. Seventy two percent of the peasant families,
which included the most destitute among them, therefore
received nothing.
The goal of the agraian reform program was an increased
sense of social justice and heightened productivity rather
than a redistribution of income derived from land ownership.
The only recipients who benefitted significantly were the
coastal sugar cooperatives. The large rural haciendas dis-
appeared, but the ingrained power structures remained intact.
In the final analysis, the reforms were largely a failure.
In Ayacucho , the least benefitted zone, approximately 30,000
families acquired property, though the average value of the
property was a mere 4,900 soles per family (under 150 dol-
lars). This pales in comparison to such average values as
162,288 soles per family in the coastal department of Lima,
or even the figures of 62,171 soles in Puno and 22,116 soles
in Huancayo, other departments located in the highlands.
Effective reform required a profitable dynamic center in
George Philip, The Rise and Fall of the Peruvian Military
Radicals 1968-1976 (London: The Athlone Press, 1978), pp.
114-121.
« fi •*
Estadistica de la Reforma Agraria (a 31 de Marzo de
1977), Table 3, cited by Cynthia McClintock, "Why Peasants
Rebel: The Case of Peru's Sendero Luminoso," p. 67.
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order to distribute gains to other peasant members. The
haciendas of Ayacucho, however, were not profitable. The
minority of haciendas that had been productive were stripped
of movable assets before the reforms were implemented. These
less prosperous haciendas were associated with many more
Indian peasant communities, and therefore more potential
recipients, than in other parts of the country. The situation
was further exacerbated by the low regional priority granted
toward reform initiatives.
International recession, economic mismanagement, and
overly ambitious programs spelled doom for the Velasco regime.
On 19 August 197 5, General Francisco Morales Bermudez took
power in a bloodless counter-coup with the full support of
the military. The ouster of General Velasco coincided with
the worst economic crisis since the War of the Pacific in the
nineteenth century. General Morales came to power in order
to impose stern solutions to the looming foreign debt problem.
His administration responded in an orthodox fashion, imple-
menting austere IMF-approved monetary and fiscal restraints.
This capital-accumulation oriented monetarist strategy was
employed in order to emerge from the crisis by restricting
redistributive schemes, thereby depressing the living standards
of the popular masses. Between October 1975 and August 1978,
real wages fell by thirty five percent. Prices rocketed by
David Scott Palmer, "Sendero Luminoso : Rebellion in
Rural Peru," p. 82.
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221 percent between December 1974 and February 1978. In the
three years between December 1975 and December 1978, the
Peruvian currency was devalued by 446 percent against the U.S.
dollar. As a result of the deflationary measures of the
Velasco administration, per capita GNP fell by twelve percent
gbetween 1974 and 1978. In addition, Morales drastically
curtailed public spending and basic food subsidies.
The economic situation soon led to increases in public
unrest and protests, particularly from the urban sector.
This, in turn, was countered with government repression.
By 1978, the military became convinced that a return to the
barracks was necessary. In June of that year, the Peruvian
electorate voted for a constituent assembly to draft the new
Constitution, which was adopted in 1979. For the first time
in Peruvian history, the Left emerged as a significant elec-
toral force, obtaining thirty one percent of the votes at a
national level. These results were even more pronounced in
the capital. By the summer of 1980, most of the nation anxiously
anticipated the upcoming presidential elections with the hope
that the return of a democratic regime might provide a solu-
tion to the dismal economic and social situation. Few,
however, could have predicted the simultaneous launch of
J.jyi. Caballero, From Belaunde to Belaunde: Peru's
Military Experiment in Third-Roadism , Working Paper Series
No. 36, Centre of Latin American Studies, Cambridge, 1981,
pp. 18-19, cited in Lewis Taylor, Maoism in the Andes ,
p. 3.
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an armed insurgency by Sendero Luminoso, much less the rami-
fications it would have throughout the country in the years
to come
.
In effect, from 1963 to 1980, three governments of vari-
ous political persuasions ruled Peru. Although each supported
different political ideals, each was burdened by crises
stemming from continual debt problems compounded by low
export prices and revenues. Rural development projects
initiated under Belaunde were later terminated due to the
implementation of national financial austerity measures and
a drop in international development funds provided by the
United States government. In the Andean highlands, this meant
that expectations and faith in the central government were
awakened among the peasantry, only to be decimated shortly
thereafter. In any event, the agrarian reforms of the 19 60 's
and 1970' s brought little change to the Indian communities
of Ayacucho . By 1980, the local situation of the peasantry
was deteriorating due to the termination of development pro-
grams coupled with the ineffectiveness of the military reform
initiatives
.
The administrations of Belaunde, Velasco, and Morales
coincided with the rise of Sendero and its preparation to
launch the rebellion. Sendero was able to capitalize on the
degenerating situation, finding its ideology more widely
accepted among a mobilized peasantry than the failed revo-
lutionary efforts of 19 65. The increased importance of the
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University of Huamanga and its development initiatives in
Ayacucho, the center of Sendero strength prior to its going
underground in 197 8, provided a natural vehicle to incite
the peasantry. The failure of the government to improve the
welfare of the rural population left many in search of a new
and promising alternative which Sendero readily provided.
The 19 80 election of President Fernando Belaunde Terry
was a specific rebuke' to the military, which had ruled the
country for the preceeding twelve years. By installing the
same person that General Velasco had ousted, the electorate
resolutely demonstrated that a civilian elected government,
even one with proven flaws, was a superior alternative to
military rule. Nonetheless, Belaunde inherited the overwhelm-
ing debt crisis and recession left behind by the Morales
administration. He responded by immediately implementing
IMF-approved measures such as social spending cuts, wage
freezes, and currency devaluation in order to secure necessary
bank loans. These policies paralleled those taken by his
predecessor in 1975. Additionally, a law was passed in 1980
which halted land redistribution, reduced the legal protec-
tion of peasant cooperatives, and lifted the restrictions on
the purchase and sale of land. In some areas of the country,
this precipitated a return of the traditional landowners and
and the return of ownership of up to eighty percent of their
9
confiscated land.
9America's Watch, Abdicating Democratic Authority
, p. 15
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Initially, the new government was unconcerned about the
disruptive sabotage and militant actions taking place in
the southern highlands. Sendero Luminoso was considered
just another inconsequential radical political offshoot pre-
senting no real threat other than annoying the local inhabi-
tants. No special eradication or contingency programs were
contemplated, as the local police forces were considered up
to the task. The damage inflicted by Sendero was publicly
attributed to delinquents and criminals of the region.-
In a few short months of increasing guerrilla triumphs,
the Belaunde administration began to see that Sendero Luminoso
represented a more serious problem than previously antici-
pated. By October, moderate and conservative legislators
in the Senate proposed a bill defining such acts as sabotage,
subversion, and terrorism as being treasonous, thereby carry-
ing a stiffer penalty. The APRA initially opposed the legis-
lation, maintaining that terrorist acts constituted a criminal
offense of less severity than treason to the fatherland.
In January 1981, Interior Minister Jose Maria de la Jara
y Ureta announced that a vast anti-terrorism campaign would
be conducted by a coordinated police effort, supported
logistically by the armed forces. The military was to provide
means of transportation not available to the police, such as
the use of helicopters. The principal damage done by the
guerrillas up to this point had been the destruction of
electrical towers, while most other physical harm had been
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relatively minor. The strategy of Sendero Luminoso at this
point was centered around agitation and armed propaganda.
Their principal goal was the mobilization of the populace,
rather than an outright major offensive, since they had an
inadequate resource base to accomplish the latter. Even
so, although the militant actions of the insurgents were
still at a low level, their operations far exceeded the capaci-
ties of the normal police forces to control them.
Decree 046, the anti-terrorist law, was successfully
passed in March of 1981. Anyone convicted of terrorism was
subject to a sentence of twenty five years, and a fine of
up to 8,000 dollars. Police were allowed to detain suspects
for up to fifteen days without interference from the judicial
system. The legal definition of a terrorist was left delib-
erately vague in order to give the police broad discretion
in pursuing the Senderistas. A person could be considered
a terrorist if found guilty of:
1) Provoking fear or terror among the general population.
2) Destroying public or private buildings, communica-
tions facilities, or pipelines.
3) Commiting acts that endanger life, health, or
possessions of other people.
4) Making, acquiring, or storing firearms, explosives,
or their ingredients.
5) Adversely affecting international relations or the
security of the state.
10 FBIS, 5 January 1981, p. Jl
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6) Forming part of a band of three or more people who
utilize terror to accomplish their objectives.
7) Using the news media to incite people to terrorism.
8) Speaking out publicly in favor of an act of terrorism
or a terrorist.
H
An increasingly concerned Belaunde began to meet secretly
with the ministers of the Interior and Defense, trying to
formulate contingency plans in case the new counterinsurgency
effort proved unsuccessful. After an escalation of terrorist
actions in April, the government began to study in earnest
the possibility of military intervention in Ayacucho. Clearly,
the president had a right to be concerned. Belaunde was faced
with a national environment that paralleled much of his earlier
tenure. A burdensome foreign debt, financial austerity, a
lack of resources, and a growing insurgency resounded with
a similarity to the mid-1960 's. Sending the military to dis-
pense with the new insurgents of Sendero Luminoso might have
provided a short term solution, but it was nothing more than
a last-chance alternative given the political situation of
the nascent and fragile democracy.
By June, Minister of the Interior Jose Maria de la Jara
y Ureta publicly declared that terrorist actions throughout
the nation had been declining due to the diligent efforts of
the police. Minister de la Jara praised the work of the
Sinchis, stating, "I believe that their efforts have allowed
us to thwart and control many terrorist actions which were
America's Watch, Abdicating Democratic Authority
, p. 32
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being planned." He added that there was no need for the
reorganization of the police forces, as the present system
12
was in keeping with the new constitution. Such proclamations
of antisubversive success were to become commonplace through-
out the remainder of the Belaunde term in office. Although
periods of relative calm did occur from time to time, these
were more related to the review and revision of tactics by
the Sendero leadership than to any great advances on the part
of the security forces.
In October 19 81, President Belaunde suddenly announced
the first major changes in his cabinet since taking power
eighteen months earlier. These changes gave the military a
greater voice in the policy process. Although rumors of a
military coup continued, these were consistently denied by
ranking officers who proclaimed their commitment to upholding
the democratic constitution. The ministerial changes appear
to have been another attempt by Belaunde to placate his former
adversaries. The two most notable changes took place in the
ministries of War and Interior. Retired General Jose
Gagliardi, former head of the Aeronautics Ministry, replaced
de la Jara as Minister of the Interior. General Luis Cisneros
Vizquerra, a former Minister of Interior in 1976 under the
Morales regime, was appointed Minister of War. In other
changes, Vice Admiral Jose Carvajal, the active duty Inspector
12
FBIS, 6 July 1981, p. J2
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General of the Navy, was designated as Minister of the Navy
while Air Force commander General Hernan Boluarte assumed
control of the Aeronautics Ministry. Belaunde maintained that
the appointments of active duty officers to ministerial posts
were consistent with constitutional law. Whatever the inten-
tion, the occupation of these positions by general officers
was certain to give the military institution a far greater
role in the formation of policy regarding Sendero Luminoso.
Sendero considered the Belaunde administration no differ-
ent than those before it regarding the needs of the tradi-
tionally oppressed classes of society. In a 1982 interview
with a Sendero militant, Comrade Pedro stated,
The Belaunde government represents the bureaucratic
bourgeoisie, the same which heads the counterrevolu-
tionary camp, commands the feudal landownders and
bourgeoisie, and is tied to yankee imperialism. The
crisis of the government, in essence, is the inevitable
consequence of deepening and forcing capitalist develop-
ment in a semi-feudal and semi-colonial country, such
as Peru. It is the necessary derivation of the evolu-
tion of the semi-feudal sector, of not destroying it,
and the development of the semi-colonial, of not
erasing the domination of imperialism. 13
Beneath the rhetoric, Comrade Pedro echoes the familiar
precept that the Belaunde government must fall in order that
the new state, headed by the Sendero vanguard, can rise to
power
.
Sendero displayed a well organized and executed military
plan during the 2 March 1982 attack and occupation of the
Interview with Camarada Pedro in "Los Reportajes de
Manuel Gongora Prado , " reproduced in Rogger Mercado , El




maximum security prison in Ayacucho . This action signalled
the initiation of regular guerrilla actions and demonstrated
to the government that the movement was prepared to up the
ante in the course of the revolutionary struggle. At this
time, Sendero controlled large areas of territory in the
southern highlands, and enjoyed wide support, or at least
complacency, among much of the rural population. Rather than
continuing his denouncements of the group as criminals and
delinquents, Belaunde attributed its new success to an alli-
ance between terrorists and drug traffickers, adding that
Sendero was not an indigenous movement, but instead was
derived from revolutionary thought imported from abroad.
Although the president was to frequently repeat these charges
during his remaining years in office, no firm evidence to
prove the denunciations was ever made public.
Throughout the remainder of 198 2, Sendero brazenly expanded
its presence undaunted by the security forces sent to counter
it. By September, the Interior Minister announced that the
armed forces would begin to patrol some of the areas affected
by terrorism, thus increasing its cooperation with the police
14forces to more than a logistics role. By the end of the
year, the situation had grown sufficiently bad to merit
official military intervention in the Emergency Zone. This
decision was taken in a secret meeting of 320 high-ranking
14
FBIS, 9 September 1982, p. Jl
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officers on 21 December, during which the joint command tied
the military intervention to political and economic concessions
by the government. According to military sources, one of
the conditions was that Guardia Civil General Juan Belaguer
not be appointed to head the Ministry of the Interior.
Shortly thereafter, President Belaunde made a futile plea
for those involved in the subversion to lay down arms within
seventy two hours. Sendero responded with its own ultimatum,
granting the government twenty four hours to remove the mili-
tary troops from Ayacucho. In response, Belaunde called upon
his field commanders to eradicate Sendero during the sixty-
day declared state of emergency. Such a request naturally
goaded the military into a "body count" type of strategy in
an effort to demonstrate large successes over a short term.
Unable to proclaim real success, the military continued this
strategy of killing many innocent civilians during the con-
tinuous renewal of the state of emergency which followed.
1983 proved even more frustrating to the Belaunde govern-
ment, as Peru was devastated by a declining economy and an
insurgency that refused to die. Strict fiscal restraints were
still in effect to service the fourteen billion dollar foreign
debt. Additionally, the drastic climatic changes brought
about as a result of the shift in the El Nino current caused
much of the nation to suffer tremendous agricultural damage
resulting from drought and floods. In the spirit of an
FBIS, 28 December 1982, p. Jl
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established tradition of the police of publicly displaying
their morale problems and specifically the lack of an effec-
tive counterinsurgency apparatus, the Guardia Republicana
brought in the new year with a twenty-four hour strike in
Ayacucho. The strikers protested alleged unfair treatment
by certain officers, and complained of not being relieved of
their duty in Ayacucho at the specified time. Their communi-
que stated that relief was supposed to occur every three
months due to Ayacucho 's status as a danger zone, and that
replacements had not arrived on schedule. It also asserted
that the guardsmen were carrying out their duties in diffi-
cult circumstances and were at a disadvantage against the
guerrillas, which had claimed the lives of forty police the
16previous year.
President Belaunde continued to blame the Sendero insur-
gency on narcotics funding and revolutionary thought, exported
by groups outside of Peru. Relations between the Catholic
church and the administration were also in a state of decay.
Belaunde accused certain foreign priests of inciting the
people to commit acts of violence, stating, "We have serious
doubts about the authenticity of certain congregations." He
accused these elements of bringing "ideological garbage"
into the country. Following this, the official News Agency
FBIS, 17 January 1983, p. Jl
.






distributed a report alleging that 120 foreign priests
were involved in subversive acts, and that some had helped
transfer food from Caritas, the charitable agency of the
church, to the guerrillas. The Episcopal Assembly of fifty
18four bishops firmly denied these accusations.
In acting against Sendero , the government encountered its
greatest difficulty in the lack of an effective intelligence
network. This was due to three principal causes. Sendero
had chosen to infiltrate a peasantry completely outside the
realm of the Peruvian society of the coastal urban power
centers. An effective infrastructure for the gathering of
intelligence was, therefore, not in existence in 19 80. Such
a network is not easily built, and requires a great deal of
time to develop. Additionally, the government could not
allocate necessary resources due to budgetary constraints
and a desire not to upset the military by fueling the buildup
of its traditional institutional rival. Moreover, much of
the intelligence capacity of the police services had been
dismantled during the twelve year period of military rule.
Vice-President Fernando Schwalb addressed these concerns
during a 19 83 interview in which he said,
The most effective way to fight against this kind of
unconventional war is by perfecting the intelligence
system, finding out where the terrorists gain support,
who the leaders are, what their objectives are and where
they plan to act. A well-oriented intelligence
service may achieve progress in destroying a terrorist
Americas Watch, Abdicating Democratic Authority, p. 4 8
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organization, and anticipate its actions. Moreover,
it is necessary to improve transportation and communi-
cation means so that joint Army and police actions--
this is already a fact—may be carried out simultaneously.
Terrorists have the advantage that they perpetrated an
attack without us knowing about it. 19
In June, the government announced the formation of an
Anti-Subversion Combat Staff at the Interior Ministry. The
staff would be composed of police members who analyze reports
submitted by the intelligence services of the police and
armed forces. The staff would then decide upon the necessary
actions, and plan the operations of the three police forces.
This followed an announcement by Belaunde the previous month
that the armed forces were to be gradually withdrawn and re-
placed by a modernized police force. This was deemed possible
due to. the apparent retreat of the guerrillas. In July, the
PIP announced the formation of a special Antiterrorism Direc-
torate, assigned to investigate and prepare cases against
subversion and terrorist actions throughout the country.
The DIRCOTE was to be staffed by specialists in the fight
against terror, such as experts in explosives, ballistics,
21dactylography, and police identification methods.
Beginning in 19 83, the Peruvian government came under
increasing criticism by international human rights organiza-
tions for abuses occurring in the Emergency Zone. Amnesty
19
FBIS, 9 February 1983, p. J3
20
FBIS, 13 June, 1983, p. Jl.
21
FBIS, 20 July 1983, p. Jl .
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International submitted a letter to President Belaunde in
August calling for immediate investigation • of numerous cases
of alleged disappearances and political executions. The
chief executive responded publicly by stating that he had no
respect for the organization, and that all letters from the
group were destined for the trash can. He later said that
Amnesty International cares only about those who follow
22
communist ideology. When the Amnesty letter was published
the following month, Belaunde categorically denied the reports,
and maintained that the forces under the command of General
Clemente Noel in the Emergency Zone were operating with full
respect for human rights, even those of the insurgents.
Throughout the remainder of his time in office, Belaunde was
to continue his practice of public denial regarding the abuses
of the counterinsurgency effort.
One of the more interesting aspects of the highlands
situation has been the broadcasts from Radio Havana in the
Quechua language aimed toward audiences in the Andean coun-
tries of Peru, Ecuador, and Chile. These broadcasts are heard
daily. Broadcasts on Monday through Friday are typically
divided into three fifteen minute sections separated by music.
The initial section carries two to ten news items, mostly
relating to Cuba. The final two sections carry commentaries
on a variety of topics, though rarely pertaining to the
Andean region. Sunday broadcasts contain fewer items, and
22
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again have traditionally lacked news of local interest.
However, beginning in 1982, the broadcasts began to carry
more news on Peru. The frequency of Peruvian items increased
from one item every three days in 19 8 2 to one every two days
in 1983. Additionally, more of the Quechua items were unique
rather than a repetition of a prior broadcast item in
23Spanish. Although the broadcasts had persisted over an
extended period, the 'Peruvian government took steps to pro-
test them in September 1983. Peruvian Deputy Victor Garcia
denounced the broadcasts as "clear Cuban interference in
our domestic affairs." He termed the broadcasts unfriendly,
and criticized their reportage on the counterinsurgency effort
24
of the security forces.
In spite of continued protests, the Castro regime has
refused to modify the broadcasts. As recently as March
1986, Alberto Valencia Cardenas, APRA deputy for Ayacucho,
charged that Radio Havana continues to broadcast messages
encouraging armed struggle in Peru. According to Valencia,
one of the subversive texts states,
Many years ago, we were as poor as you are now. We
wanted to live, and we died every day because of the
rich. We know that you are ready to fight, and we
received that news with joy. The only way to seize
power is through armed struggle. Justice is written
with blood. 2 5
23
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In retrospect, 1983 was an especially difficult one for
the Belaunde administration. Severe austerity measures
combined with the worldwide recession and low market prices
for Peruvian exports wreaked havoc on the national economy.
While economic activity had risen nominally in 1981-82,
in 1983 the GDP fell by twelve percent. Per capita income
decreased by 14.3 percent. This was concurrent with an infla-
tion rate that surpassed 125 percent, and a 130 percent de-
2 fi
valuation of the national currency. As a result of the
reversal of agricultural reforms and the changes in climate
brought about by the El Nino current, agricultural production
dropped sharply. Amidst this atmosphere of chaos, Sendero
Luminoso continued to be elusive and successful.
1984 proved to be no easier -for the Belaunde government
in the counterrevolutionary struggle. The administration
continued to be restricted by austerity measures which pre-
vented increases in spending to help the neglected southern
highlands. The national budget dedicated a full one-third
to service the foreign debt. An additional twenty five per-
cent was allocated to the military, while a total of fifteen
percent was allowed for all social services, including health,
education, and housing.
The military, backed by the President, continued to deny
that any abuses of authority were occurring in the Emergency
2 fi
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Zone. Official communique 07-84, promulgated in May,
declared
,
In view of the disinformation campaign launched by
a Lima daily, which has been reporting over the past
few days on presumed acts of indiscipline and low
morale among the forces of order in the Emergency
Zone, the Army Command hereby informs the citizenry of
the following: 1) The reports disseminated are com-
pletely untrue, since the behavior of Army personnel,
something which the Army command is always concerned
about, is absolutely normal, and the performance of
the Political-Military Command is not hampered in
any way whatsoever -by acts which are contrary to dis-
cipline or morale. 2) This is the solid truth, since
the Army command, conducting a program of visits to
military garrisons—a program that has been underway
since February 1984—has just returned from the
Emergency Zone and has duly verified that the situa-
tion is normal. Therefore, those media reports are
bluntly denied. 28
The failure of all previous measures to control or eradi-
cate Sendero Luminoso was admitted on 20 July when the police
forces were ordered to return to the performance of their
regular duties, and the military was given the responsi-
bility of the counterinsurgency operation throughout the
nation. The military expanded its control in the Emergency
Zone, and assumed many of the responsibilities previously
held by the Ministry of the Interior. Given the nature of
the Sendero threat and the corruption and poorly equipped
status of the police forces, the military was seen as the
only actor possessing the resources and developed infrastruc-
ture to deal with the insurrection. Additionally, the Armed
Forces Joint Command was to be the only organization authorized
FBIS, 10 May 1984, p. Jl
124
to inform the public on the results of the counterinsurgency
operations. This worried critics, who saw the enhanced
authority of the military as a vehicle to maintain the cen-
sorship which had permeated the Emergency Zone.
The following month, President Belaunde announced the
creation of an additional specialized corps of the Guardia
Civil. The Andean Guard [Guardia Andina] was to be a new
police body designed .to study and fight subversion throughout
the mountainous regions of Peru. The Andean Guard was to be
composed of inhabitants of the highlands region, and to be
29headquartered in the town of Huaytara , department of Ayacucho
.
By establishing a police body of this type, Belaunde hoped
to construct a security agent of the state which would have
a true sense of legitimacy among the Quechua-speaking popula-
tion of the cordillera. The idea was obviously long term
in nature, as the recruitment, training, and deployment of
such a force would preclude it from being of any immediate
help against Sendero Luminoso. Unfortunately, this provides
a perfect example of reaction to, rather than prevention
of, a set of fundamental problems converted into a widespread
crisis
.
While the Military-Political Command began to report
success in curtailing Sendero actions in the Emergency Zone,
the guerrillas were successful in spreading their operations
to other rural areas of the country, as well as making their
29
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presence felt in Lima and other cities. Their success in
previous years inspired other radical groups to take up arms.
In September 1984, a new urban guerrilla group known as the
Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Amaru (MRTA) , or Tupacamarus
,
became active. In contrast to the clandestine style of
Sendero, the Tupacamarus publicly take credit for their
attacks. Initially it was speculated that the Tupacamarus
were an urban element of Sendero operating under a new name
and format in order to convince the government that two
different threats existed when, in actuality, there was one.
Further study, however, indicates that the Tupacamarus are
a descendant of the radical Movement of the Revolutionary Left
(MIR-Venceremos) radicals of the 19 60's with a close ideo-
logical affiliation to Fidel Castro. The Tupacamarus, as
well as Sendero, have continued to carry out numerous actions
in the urban theater, although their mutual coordination has
not been publicly revealed.
By 1985, the Peruvian electroate was clearly ready for
a change in political leadership and national direction.
In the April 14 elections, Alan Garcia and APRA garnered
forty seven percent of the vote, double that of the runner-up
Marxist United Left. The conservative and moderate factions
which had dominated the political life for decades suffered
30 FBIS, 21 September 1984, p. J2
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a major setback, receiving less than twenty percent. The
youthful and energetic Garcia assumed office committed to
action and reform. His rise to the presidency took place
at a time when half of the population was unemployed or
underemployed. The purchasing power of the average wage
earner had declined forty percent in the last ten years. Two
percent of the population controlled sixty percent of the
wealth, while thirty -'eight percent lived on less than two
32percent of the annual GDP.
During his July inauguration, President Garcia announced
a series of sweeping reforms that would aid in the struggle
against Sendero. In contrast to the policies of his prede-
cessor, the military would be held fully accountable for any
excesses and abuses of authority in the counterinsurgency
campaign. A dramatic purge and structural reorganization of
the police forces would occur in order to make them a respected
and effective instrument of public order. A Peace Commission
would be ordered to explore alternative solutions to the
Sendero Luminoso problem, coupled with an increase in public
expenditures and development programs for the rural areas.
In order to help finance these initiatives, President Garcia
boldly announced that Peru would dedicate no more than ten
percent of its annual foreign exchange earnings towards the
Riordan Roett, "Peru: The Message from Garcia,"
Foreign Affairs , Winter 1985/86, p. 282.
32 Roett, "Peru: The Message from Garcia," p. 280.
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service of the foreign debt. While some pointed out that
the ten percent figure would surpass the amount paid by the
Belaunde administration the previous year, the political im-
pact of Garcia 's announcement had repercussions among the
other Latin American debtor nations, as well as on the inter-
national financial community.
The President wasted little time in taking on the mili-
tary. Following the -implication of military troops in the
mass deaths of at least forty peasants in a counterinsurgency
operation, Garcia dismissed General Cesar Enrico, chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In addition, the two ranking
officers in the Emergency Zone were relieved of their posts.
To expand its capacity to monitor the situation, the adminis-
tration announced the formation of a General Human Rights
Bureau headed by the office of the Attorney General. Presi-
dent Garcia went on to modify the once sacrosanct military
budget. In November, the decision was made to reduce the
order of French Mirage 2000 fighter aircraft from twenty six
33
to twelve, thereby saving hundreds of millions of dollars.
Even more remarkable were his rapid and comprehensive
actions regarding the police forces. One of the first laws
passed by the APRA government authorized the executive branch
to fully reorganize the police forces under the direction of
a commission headed by the Interior Minister. The legislation
33 Hugh ' Shaughnessy , "Peruvian Leader Launches Anti-
Armaments Crusade," Financial Times of London, 28 November 1985
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was intended to provide the basis for complete overhaul and
restructuring of the security network. Civil Guard General
Antonio Nunez Vidalon, in a report to the Inspector General
of the Interior Ministry, reported on the sad state of his
organization.
I have confirmed in the majority of the units visited,
from the posts to the regions, with honorable exceptions,
a supine ignorance in the exercise of the functions
and duties of the respective commands; a disconcerting
lack of the most elemental juridical principles that
are the legal foundations of our regulations; a profound
relaxation of discipline. Officers and troops are gravely
involved in drug trafficking, smuggling, etc. Officers
exist that oblige their subordinates not only to consume
alcohol, participate in games of chance, and other degrad-
ing vices, but also oblige them to collect money, extort-
ing the public, to fill their wallets with dirty money
counting, without doubt, on the complacency of unscrupu-
lous superiors that will take no action.
He added that excellence and professionalism are discouraged
because,
there exist no rewards for good actions nor sanctions
for the incorrect ones, to the extreme that the excel-
lent, the regular, the good, and the bad receive the
same treatment and almost the same evaluations.-^
One of the principal causes of the lack of professional-
ism among the Guardia Civil cadres was the lack of training
in the police academies. In previous years, the length of
training at the GC Academy lasted a period of three years.
By the time that Alan Garcia took office, accelerated courses
decreased the time to graduate to a mere three months.
34
"Radiograf ia de las F.F.P.P.," Eguis X , 12 August 1985,
p. 9 .
Reorganizacion de la Policia," Equix X , 18 August
1985, p. 6.
129
It was simply not possible to train any semblance of a pro-
fessional force in such a short time. The lack of training
among the younger personnel, combined with the poor leadership
of the middle and upper echelons, created an overall condition
of abysmal organization for maintaining domestic order,
especially when that order was disturbed by something as
proficient and committed as the Sendero guerrillas.
By February 1986,' the Garcia administration had purged
1,700 men from the three police forces, including seventy
generals. The fired policemen, however, now represent another
dimension in the security problem. They are bitter and unem-
ployed, and many still possess their badges and weapons. Lima
has recently seen a huge increase in kidnappings for ransom,
many of which have been attributed to disenchanted ex-policemen
In order to arm the new forces effectively, the Garcia admin-
istration has recently purchased 10,000 assault rifles from
North Korea at the low price of ninety two dollars per weapon.
South Korea, meanwhile, has donated fifty patrol cars, and
the Peruvian government has announced the expenditure of 2.7 5
million dollars for the purchase of 250 new cars assembled
36in Peru.
With Supreme Justice Resolution 221-86, the administration
officially created the Peace Commission that Garcia had
-5 C
William D. Montalbano , "Lima Prefers Army's Order to
None at All," Los Angeles Times, 26 February 1985.
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mentioned in his inaugural address. Article Three of the
resolution defines the functions of the commission as the
following
:
To examine the legal situation of the persons who have
been detained for terrorist actions and who profess
to be innocent; propose to public organs how to distin-
guish between terrorism by acts or complicity and politi-
cal acts; coordinate with the judicial branch, without
detriment to its independence, ways to speed up the
prosecution of citizens charged with terrorist crimes;
establish channels for dialogue intended to persuade
those who resort to violence and terrorism to return
to social coexistence under democracy, in accordance
to the Constitution and the laws of the Republic; process
denunciations that have been made or will be made re-
garding violations of human rights—through deaths,
executions without due process, disappearances, torture,
or abuse of authority—by public organs; review legisla-
tive decree Number 04 6 and propose modifications deemed
appropriate; report on the situation and condition of
detention centers; report on the situation of victims of
acts of violence and that of their families, proposing
measures that should be adopted; and advise the
President of the Republic on questions when he requests
its counsel regarding subversive and human rights
problems. 3'
In spite of President Garcia' s popularity and sweeping
reforms, Sendero Luminoso continues to maintain pressure
throughout much of the nation. Following a series of bomb-
ings in February, Garcia placed the capital under a sixty
day state of emergency. Although the Army claims to have
limited Senderist militant actions in the Emergency Zone,
the guerrillas have opened two new fronts in similarly de-
pressed regions of the north and south. Garcia was particu-
larly distressed when the members of his Peace Commission
FBIS, 17 September 1985, p. J2
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offered their resignations in February, citing a lack of
presidential support in the accomplishment of their mission.
He refused the resignations, and publicly reemphasized the
necessity for such an organization. Although the reforms
may have succeeded in making the military more responsible
for its actions and in purging a corrupted police network,
there is little evidence that Garcia is any closer to resolv-
ing the Sendero Lumin'oso problem than his predecessor.
With regard to the objective factors and conditions
which led to the development of Sendero, the five adminis-
trations over the past twenty three years have been plagued
by the same resource constraints regardless of the nature of
the regime or particular ideology of the participants. Dur-
ing the first tenure of Belaunde, the peasants of the southern
highlands had their hopes raised by promises of -agricultural
reform and needed development projects. In Ayacucho, the
populace benefitted the least from the land distribution
program, while developmentalist endeavors by domestic and
international organizations were quickly terminated. The
expectations of the people for a new and beneficial relation-
ship with the central government were destroyed, leaving many
exasperated and seeking an alternative solution to their
problems. This was concurrent with the rise of the regional
importance of the University of Huamanga , and the spread of
a radical ideology and message which dominated the prevailing
political environment of the institution.
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Under the leadership of General Velasco, the peasantry
again hoped for major changes with the implementation of a
major agricultural reform program. As was the case under
Belaunde, the inhabitants of Ayacucho were the least bene-
fitted group in the nation. During the administration of
General Morales, few resources were allotted to the develop-
ment of the region because of the low priority of the high-
lands, and due to the" fiscal austerity measures imposed during
a time of severe recession. From 1968-1980, the four depart-
ments where Sendero maintains its strongest hold (Huancavelica
,
Cuzco, Ayacucho, and Apurimac) received only 6.7 percent of
the total national public spending. Ironically, this was the
3 8
area where the need was greatest.
Not only was the total percentage extremely low. The
total amount of national funds for public expenditure has
been at a low level since the string of economic crises began
during the first term of Belaunde. Each successive adminis-
tration has had to contend with a large foreign debt, com-
pounded by the inability of the nation to generate foreign
earnings due to low market prices in the leading exports
of petroleum and copper. Moreover, large portions of the
budget have traditionally gone toward military spending.
Perhaps President Alan Garcia has taken a first important
step to improve the situation by his announcement of debt
servicing at an annual maximum of ten percent of accrued
38 Raul Gonzales, "Ayacucho: Por Los Caminos de Sendero,"
p. 61.
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foreign earnings. The final solution, however, rests much
more heavily on the whims of the international economy.
When Sendero Luminoso took up arms in 1980, it did so
at a critical juncture in the Peruvian political history.
Doubly hampered by the tenuous state of a nascent democracy
and an ineffective security apparatus to deal with the guer-
rillas, Belaunde sought to deny the gravity of the situation
for as long as possible. Plagued by many problems remins-
cent of his first term in office, he was reluctant to dispatch
the military until no other alternative remained. His pro-
gressive steps of dispatching the military were indicative
of the respect and fear he felt for the military institution,
as well as his commitment to see democracy survive. While
some of the conservative military officers might have called
for a more heavy-handed approach early in the struggle,
Belaunde managed to placate them by including active duty
officers in the cabinet, and allowing them more say in the
political process. The weakness of the police forces, how-
ever, dictated the eventual assumption of all anti-subversive
operations by the military hierarchy.
Although Alan Garcia has attempted to rectify many of the
problems that plagued his predecessors, there is, at present,
little that attests to an improved effectiveness of counter-
insurgency operations under his leadership. Indeed, the
state of emergency imposed on the national capital demonstrates
the capability of Sendero Luminoso to modify strategic methods
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and objectives. 'While the Senderistas pose no immediate
threat to assume power, their revolutionary struggle has
created additional problems for a central democratic authority
already overburdened with responsibilities. The grim situa-
tion in the highlands has been worsened by the flight of
much of the young population to the cities in order to avoid
the hostilities. Not only has this reduced the available
labor supply in a place where it is desperately needed, but
it has also exacerbated an already critical situation of
urban migration which has increased the population of Lima
from several hundred thousand to nearly six million in less
than forty years
.
Perhaps the greatest cause for concern lies in the future.
The election results of 19 85 show that the Peruvian elector-
ate has opted away from the traditional powers in favor of a
social democratic alternative. If Alan Garcia cannot over-
come the problems confronting him, of which Sendero plays a
significant role, two situations become possible. With the
electoral success of the Marxist United Left in the 1985
elections, the public might well choose a Marxist candidate
in 1990. Whether or not the military would allow such a
candidate to assume power remains to be seen. Given the
sound defeat of the moderate and conservative parties in the
last election, it is unlikely that the public would vote in
favor of the failed policies of the past. The other possi-
bility is the direct intervention of the military, and the
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subsequent return of a right-wing authoritarian solution to
the problems which plague the nation. With the recent failure
of the military to effectively rule from 1968-80, however,
its desire to again enter the political realm must be ques-
tioned. Regarding the Peruvian future, one thing is sure.
Sendero is willing to undermine the existence of any regime,
and while the chances for its quick eradication at present
appear slim, the abil'ity of the guerrillas to maintain a
conflict of low intensity remains a certainty.
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V. CONCLUSIONS
The Sendero Luminoso experience in Peru stems from a
historical process beginning with the conquest of the Inca
empire by the Spanish conquistadores in the sixteenth century
Since that time, the Indian populace has been relegated to
the lowest level of the social strata, and has been virtually
ignored by the central government in Lima, which is oriented
towards the needs of a Europeanized minority. While the
Indian peasants remain in a desperate situation, hardly
representative of anything remotely resembling a twentieth
century lifestyle, their impoverished condition alone is not
sufficient to create a revolutionary situation. Added to
their calamitous state was the frustration of aborted develop-
ment plans in the 19 60's and the associated hopes for a new
relationship with the central government, the exasperation
felt after the lack of change despite numerous agricultural
reform movements, and the spread of a radical message via the
University of San Cristobal Huamanga in Ayacucho. The falter-
ing promises of change finally led some elements of the
peasantry to seek the revolution promised by Sendero as the
only alternative possible for effecting fundamental change
in the social, economic, and political processes.
During the initial period of the rebellion, from 1980-
1982, Sendero enjoyed its widest support in the region
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surrounding Ayacucho. This corresponded to an early strategy
which placed less emphasis on military actions, and placed
more importance on propaganda and cultivating a favorable
image in the eyes of the peasants. By implementing their
own brand of popular justice, the guerrillas often provided
the first semblance of public services many of the peasants
had ever received. Near the end of 1982, however, the Sendero
leadership changed strategy and adopted a much more violent
form, thereby alienting many of its supporters and under-
mining much of the sense of legitimacy it had established.
The revolutionary strategy has never returned to its earlier
form, and Sendero continues to impose its will by terror
rather than by more subtle means. Although the military has
been successful in curtailing some of the guerrilla activity
within the declared Emergency Zone, the Senderistas have made
good on promises to spread their actions to other areas of
the country. The recent upsurge of terrorist activity in Lima
and other cities could well signal a change in course due to
a less than anticipated success of rural mobilization.
While Sendero has not raised their Red Army of thousands,
neither have they been eradicated by the forces available to
the state. Prior to 1983, the guerrillas were far more
dedicated and purposeful than the weak and corrupt police
forces ordered to oppose them. This left the Peruvian Army
as the only
>
institution with the sufficient resources to engage
them in a counterinsurgency effort. President Belaunde,
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reluctant to use the military because of its role in his
earlier downfall, ordered the Array to assume control only
when all other means had been exhausted. Although countless
abuses and widespread loss of innocent lives took place at
the hands of government security forces, recent evidence
indicates that the Army has become more responsible under
the Garcia administration. Even so, the ability of Sendero
Luminoso to survive the eradication efforts emphasizes that
the solution to the problem is not merely a military one.
Due to the radical stance of the Sendero leadership and its
lack of interest in political dialogue, an effective counter-
insurgency program must therefore seek to reduce the appeal
of the radical ideology at the grass-roots level. In essence,
the political avenue must be utilized not with the Senderistas,
but with the peasantry they seek to mobilize.
By 19 80, the Sendero leadership believed that the revo-
lutionary correlation of forces was sufficiently advanced to
merit the initiation of the armed struggle. At present, all
indications seem to point to an error in their assessment
of the situation. Although certain sectors of the rural
peasantry have been sympathetic to the Sendero cause, wide-
spread armed mobilization has failed to materialize. Like-
wise, the revolutionary alliance between the peasants and
their proletarian counterparts has not been realized, as the
Peruvian working class has chosen to support the democratic
process. While Sendero maintained that the political
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right had no room to maneuver and would rely on in-
'
creased repression to restore the status quo, this was
contradicted by the successful 1985 transition from Belaunde
to Garcia, and an APRA administration dedicated to more
liberal policies. One cannot deny that the government has
a long road ahead in trying to repair the disparities fostered
by the historical past, but, in spite of these conditions, the
Peruvian situation appears far from revolutionary.
Charges of foreign assistance to the Sendero insurgents
have been levied in the past, although the proof of these
allegations has never been publicly revealed. It should be
emphasized though, that many of the traditional supporters
of subversive movements would have a great deal to lose by
an association with the Senderistas. Since 1968, the Soviet
Union has worked hard to establish a favorable relationship
with Peru, and presently furnishes the Peruvian military with
large amounts of hardware. The risks associated with sup-
porting a revolutionary group with little hope of gaining
power, and jeopardizing a worthwhile political and economic
relationship, can therefore be considered to be far too great
for the U.S.S.R. to offer its support to Sendero. Moreover,
with Sendero maintaining strict adherence to Maoist philosophy
and harshly criticizing the present Chinese leadership, neither
is it likely that China is providing aid. In addition, though
Radio Havana has been active in Quechua broadcasts, any addi-
tional Cuban involvement has not been proven. As a result,
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the most plausible theory regarding outside assistance is
a link with the drug traffickers prevalent throughout the
region. In each case, the Peruvian government acts as the
enforcing agent opposing a challenge to its authority. Both
groups, therefore, would have a common interest in the occu-
pation of the security forces. If this were the case one
would expect to see the presence of high quality weapons on
the part of the guerrillas. However, at present, Sendero
militants maintain their use of dynamite, confiscated weapons,
and traditional arms to accomplish their military objectives,
thereby lessening the likelihood of this relationship.
In looking towards the future, how can the interests of
the United States be best served in its policy toward Peru
and the problems of Sendero Luminoso? The rise of Sendero is
part of a larger issue, the manifestation of a host of com-
plex problems stemming from a long history of ignoring the
basic needs of the rural peasantry. During the last two
decades, while the government has at times attempted to
improve the situation, its efforts were frequently impeded
by a lack of resources resulting from a state of economic
crisis. Due to this and other factors, the overall situation
remains bleak today. Consequently, the United States govern-
ment must support the Peruvian efforts to pragmatically deal
with the problems of its looming debt, and recognize that
such a supportive policy will be far better in the long run
than seeking to penalize the present regime for errors
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committed by previous administrations. Given the present
economic situation, the Baker Plan is a step in the right
direction, although it is not enough, as it continues to
impose IMF-approved lendor guidelines that fail to account
for Peruvian realities. By maintaining positions such as
these, we can expect to see the continued exacerbation of
the fundamental problems facing the Peruvian government and
society since the 1960's.
The national interest of the United States is best served
by the maintenance of a democratic regime in Peru. This calls
for a relaxation or liberalization of previous policies,
particularly in the economic sector, in order to help the
administration of Alan Garcia in stabilizing the national •
economy. Regarding the insurgency, the United States should .
maintain the practice of joint military training programs
to demonstrate our continued support for the regime as well
as our concern regarding the guerrilla problem. By utilizing
avenues such as increasing the frequency of exercises and
providing counterinsurgency training at the School of the
Americas, the United States can reaffirm its support for a
fellow democratic state in a positive manner. Increased
military participation, such as additional permanent military
advisors, is undesirable. Such a measure would serve to
overcommit our forces in the light of an uncertain political
future, and would certainly be utilized for negative propa-
ganda purposes by the guerrillas.
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If Alan Garcia is unable to show substantial improvement
in the fundamental problems facing his administration,
including the Sendero Luminoso rebellion, two possibilities
become likely. With the resounding defeat of the politically
moderate sector in the last elections, the voters could opt
for a Marxist candidate to rectify the woes of the nation.
The position of the military on this possibility remains un-
clear, as to whether -'it would continue to uphold the democratic
constitution or decide to intervene. If Sendero Luminoso was
to increase its true threat potential, and the Garcia or a
successor administration failed to respond effectively, the
military might once again intervene in politics on the grounds
of preserving national security. Neither of these potential
occurrences are as favorable to the United States as the
present status quo. A liberal democracy headed by a non-
Marxist executive is preferable to either a Marxist or mili-
tary regime on economic and political grounds. Hence, the
United States will benefit by assisting the present Peruvian
government and military in their effort to combat Sendero
as part of a larger overall policy.
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